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Introduction1
Mr John Doe, a citizen of state X and a multimillionaire, has a serious heart 
problem. He needs an immediate transplant to survive. Unfortunately, 
the law of state X prohibits any kind of organ trafficking. Because of 
that fact, Mr Doe decides to travel to state Y, where such transactions 
are legal. What is more, under the provisions of Y’s law, it is allowed for 
a living person whose family is destitute to sell his or her organ and such 
a transaction could provide for the maintenance of the children of the 
donor until they become adults. Mr Doe finds such a person, a citizen 
of state Y, and makes a deal – he pays for euthanasia and transplantation 
and comes back to his country in good health.
The above short story raises a question: “What shall state X do with 
Mr Doe upon his arrival?” Is everything correct? Can we, as a socie-
ty, agree to such a patently criminal act which deserves condemnation? 
Should we try to fight them by domestic policy? Does the state have any 
authority over social situations that occur abroad? The answer to these 
questions is not simple and depends on factors specific to each situation.
1 The book was written as part of the research project “Criminal liability for acts committed 
abroad. Historical, philosophical and normative aspects” funded by the National Center 
for Science under Decision DEC-2013/11/N/ HS5/04238. The work is a translation 
of selected theses, contained in the following book: Dominik Zając, Odpowiedzialność 
karna za czyny popełnione za granicą [Criminal Responsibility for Acts Committed 
Abroad ] (2017).
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Further consideration contains the argumentation for the thesis that 
every state possesses wide competence to punish acts committed abroad. 
This competence is limited only by the duty of protection of values com-
monly respected internationally2. This article presents a method of inter-
preting norms of national substantive criminal law3 in the international 
context, taking into account the achievements of Polish doctrine and 
theory of criminal law.
According to the assumption underpinning these considerations, the 
subject in the focus of criminal law is not the ontological concept of 
a perpetrator’s behaviour, but an individual’s act that violates a norm. It 
is only after a given activity or omission is proven to be unlawful that an 
act can be further verified in terms of its punishability. To simplify, for the 
state to be able to punish for something, it has to prohibit it first. Such an 
approach to the issue of criminal liability requires specifying the contents 
of the norm that is binding on the perpetrator at the time of his or her 
action or omission4. The state has to give Mr Doe a chance to recognize 
the content of the norm. Because of that fact, the traditional model of 
criminal jurisdiction, which is based on principles of jurisdiction (i.e. the 
protective principle or principle of nationality)5 is no longer adequate. 
In international or cross-border context, it is inextricably linked to the 
problem of validity of law in space. Considering the absence of relevant 
general principles adopted at the constitutional level, this issue has to be 
settled using the acquis of the theory of law and international public law.
The work is arranged into two main sections, which are further di-
vided into parts. The first one – background section – constitutes a brief 
presentation of the conceptions of limitation of the state’s powers, the 
theory of conjugated norms and the method of normative analysis. The 
second one contains the presentation of the method of practical inter-
pretation of penal norms in the international context.
2 Such approach is represented also in American doctrine of criminal law. See: Charles 
Doyle, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law, Congressional Research 
Service Report, October 31, 5 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-166.pdf.
3 The subject matter of this study is constituted by only substantive (not procedural) legal 
norms – see: Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions. On the Conditions 
of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, 186 
(Cambridge 1989); George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 7–14 (Oxford 
University Press 1998).
4 John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith, Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante Function of the 
Criminal Law, 35 Law & Soc’y Rev. 166 (2001).
5 See: Doyle, supra note 2, at 13–15.
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Background
The binding effect of legal norms, as well as the standard-setting expres-
sions that comprise these norms, have its source in a decision of the 
state as a law-making entity6. Determining the spatial limits of being in 
force and the application of penal norms requires discussing two issues 
that together will form the basis of further argumentation. Firstly, it is 
necessary to indicate which categories of state competence describe the 
right to define and apply penal norms and what factors affect their spa-
tial extent. Secondly, it seems important to carry out the characteristics 
of penal norms, taking into account the achievements of Polish theory 
and dogmatics of criminal law. For these reasons, the background sec-
tion is divided into two parts. The first part concerns the issue of state 
power and its limitation, and the second contains the description of the 
structures of penal norms and an explanation of the so-called theory of 
conjugated norms.
1. The state’s power and its limitation
It is the state which shapes social relations in a specific manner, deriving 
its competencies in this area from sovereignty7. However, its authority 
6 George C. Christie, Law, Norms and Authority, 2 (1982).
7 It is reflected is the caselaw of the ICJ, especially in the case of the S.S. LOTUS 
(France v. Turkey) P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10. (1927): “It does not, however, follow that 
international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in re-
spect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which 
Background
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is substantially limited. Here, two key limiting factors8 ought to be in-
dicated: the sovereignty of other states9 and the need to respect values 
protected under international law, especially human rights10. All activities 
it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only 
be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to extend 
the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property 
and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it 
allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the case 
under international law as it stands at present. Far from laying down a general pro-
hibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and 
the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, 
it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in 
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free 
to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable”. See: Jerzy Kranz, 
Suwerenność państwa i prawo międzynarodowe [State Sovereignty and International 
Law] in Spór o suwerenność [Dispute Over Sovereignty] 110 (Waldemar J. Wołpiuk ed., 
2001); Jerzy Kranz, Państwo i jego suwerenność [The State and Its Sovereignty], 617 
Państwo i Prawo 7 (1996); Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law 22–26 
(ed. 2d, Oxford University Press 2015); Christopher Greenwood, Sovereignty: A View 
from the International Bench, in: Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, European and 
International Perspectives 258 (Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland & Alison Young ed., 
Oxford University Press 2013); Roman Kwiecień, Teoria i filozofia prawa międzynaro-
dowego [Theory and Philosophy of International Law] 115 (2011); Roman Kwiecień, 
Państwo i jego suwerenność a prawo międzynarodowe jako system prawa [The State 
and Its Sovereignty and International Law as a System of Law], in Państwo a prawo 
międzynarodowe jako system prawa [The State and International Law as a System 
of Law] 50–54 (Roman Kwiecień ed. 2015); Tomasz Ostropolski, Zasada jurysdyk-
cji uniwersalnej w prawie międzynarodowym [Principle of Universal Jurisdiction In 
International Law] 52–55 (2008).
8 The doctrine of international law knows the term “negotiating sovereignty”, which defines 
the process of weighing sovereignty and other values recognized in the international 
community. See: Sonia Cardenas, Sovereignty Transformed? The Role of National 
Human Rights Institutions, in: Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights. Actors and 
Issues in Contemporary Human Rights Politics 34–35 (Noha Shawki & Meacheline Cox 
ed., Padstow 2009).
9 Olivier De Schutter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool for Improving the Human Rights 
Accountability of Transnational Corporations, Business & Human Rights Resource 
Centre 2006, 25–28, http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/re-
ports-and-materials/Olivier-de-Schutter-report-for-SRSG-re-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-
Dec-2006.pdf.
10 Anthony D’Amato, Jurisprudence. A  Descriptive and Normative Analysis of Law 
204–209 (Springer 1984); Wojciech Burek, Zastrzeżenia do traktatów z dziedziny 
praw człowieka [Objections to Treaties in the Field of Human Rights] 45 (2012); Anne 
Clunan, Redefining Sovereignty: Humanitarianism’s Challenge to Sovereign Immunity, in: 
Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights. Actors and Issues in Contemporary Human 
Rights Politics 7–27 (Noha Shawki & Meacheline Cox ed., Padstow 2009). The author 
points out that the progressive limitation of sovereignty at the level of law is in fact the 
consequence of social change and, in essence, merely constitutes the legalization of 
The state’s power and its limitation
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undertaken by the state, both in the area of enactment and application 
of the law, must remain within these specified limits.
The aim of this paper is to indicate a method of interpreting penal 
norms in the international context, so it seems particularly significant 
to determine spatial limits for two categories of powers: legislative ju-
risdiction11 and the right to punish (ius puniendi). The need to consider 
the topic simultaneously from both perspectives is determined by the 
dual nature of penal norms. On the one hand, these norms govern the 
behaviour of the addressees, while on the other, their main objective is 
to determine conditions a punishment has to meet to be imposed on 
the perpetrator. This approach determines the way in which the scope 
of the standard-setting competence is established for specific directival 
expressions included in the norm. Those that are of a more regulatory 
nature depend primarily on the limits of the standard-setting powers. 
Others that pertain to the measure of penalty are more linked to the 
limits of the right to punish.
In both cases, determining any precise limits is very difficult, if not 
impossible. No unambiguous solutions are set forth in this regard by 
international law, whereas individual states pursue maximisation rather 
than a limitation of their own powers. In this perspective, the disquisition 
presented below ought to be considered more as a collection of certain 
validation arguments that support either recognition or negation of the 
competencies of a given state, rather than as a description of regulations 
of imperative nature.
the facts; see also: Jean L. Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty. Rethinking Legality, 
Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism 159–178 (Cambridge University Press 2012); Oona 
A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 145–148 (2008); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 125 
(Princeton University Press 1999); Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: The Evolution of an 
Idea 114–134 (Cambridge University Press 2007). This tendency has been reflected 
in ICTY jurisprudence – see e.g.: The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a/“Dule” (Decision 
on the Defence Motion or Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 
ICTY, 2 October 1995.
11 Marek Wasiński, Jurysdykcja legislacyjna państwa w prawie międzynarodowym publicz-
nym [The Legislative Jurisdiction of the State in Public International Law], 673 Państwo 
i Prawo 57 (2002); Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1587 
(1978); Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1677 (2013); John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 Am. 
J.  Int’l L. 355 (2010); John H. Knox, Legislative Jurisdiction, Judicial Canons, and 
International Law, 100 Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 1349127, 2 (2009).
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1.1. The limits of legislative jurisdiction
The power of the state to set standards for specific social situations is 
referred to as legislative jurisdiction. Like every competence of the state, 
the norm-setting power is also derived from sovereignty. The fact that 
sovereignty is an attribute of the state as a political entity gives rise to 
significant consequences for spatial limits of the effectiveness of norms. 
The commonly recognised essential elements of the state are the territory, 
the people, and the authority exercised over the people12. Sovereignty 
is not linked expressly to any of the above elements but to the state in 
general13. At the same time, sovereignty serves as the source of the pre-
sumptive competence in regard to matters concerning the state14. In this 
perspective, the term “matters concerning the state” cannot be limited 
to situations occurring within its borders. “Matters concerning the state” 
12 Definig the state by the triad: authority, territory, population has its roots in the peace 
treaties ending the Thirty Years War. The most important were signed in Munster and 
Osnabuck in 1648 – they created Model of Westphalian Sovereignty – Roman Kwiecień, 
Suwerenność państwa. Rekonstrukcja i znaczenie idei w prawie międzynarodowym 
[State Sovereignty. Reconstruction and the Importance of the Idea in International 
Law] 23–25 (2004). See also: Kranz, Państwo, supra note 7, at 4; Teresa Łoś-Nowak, 
Pozycja państwa w systemie międzynarodowym i odgrywane role [The Position of 
the State in the International System and Roles Played], in Pokój i sprawiedliwość 
przez prawo międzynarodowe. Zbiór studiów z okazji sześćdziesiątej rocznicy urodzin 
Profesora Janusza Gilasa [Peace and Justice Through International Law. a Collection 
of Studies on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Birth of Professor Janusz 
Gilas] 194–196 (Cezary Mik ed., 2007); John A. Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign 
World, 18 Fla. J. Int’l L. 919–925 (2006); Diane P. Wood, The Structure of Sovereignty, 
18 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 217 (2014); Martin Loughlin, Why Sovereignty? Sovereignty 
and the Law: Domestic, European and International Perspectives 44 (Richard Rawlings, 
Peter Leyland & Alison Young eds., Oxford University Press 2013); Jan Białocerkiewicz, 
Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne. Zarys wykładu 149 [Public International Law. Outline 
of the Lecture] (2005); Jerzy Tyranowski, Integralność terytorialna, nienaruszalność 
granic i samostanowienie w prawie międzynarodowym [Territorial Integrity, Inviolability 
of Borders and Self-Determination in International Law] 11 (1990); Aniela Dylus, 
Suwerenność państwa narodowego na tle współczesnych procesów gospodarczych 
[The Sovereignty of the Nation State Against the Background of Modern Economic 
Processes], in: Suwerenność państwa i jej granice [The Sovereignty of the State and 
Its Borders] 183–197 (Sławomir Sowiński&Janusz Węgrzecki eds., 2010); Julian Ku, 
John Yoo, Globalization and Sovereignty, 31 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 227–232 (2013).
13 It should be pointed out, however, that there are also conceptions that merge sover-
eignty exclusively from the territory, see: Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 28–31, 44.
14 In the scope of this study, the term “matters concerning the state” is used to distinguish 
it from the “internal affairs of the state”, which refers to the category of cases that fall 
under the exclusive competence of the state.
The state’s power and its limitation
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are also matters of its citizens and matters related to the organisation of 
its operations15.
By means of its authorities, the state exercises its responsibilities and 
powers in respect of the territory and the people. The above-mentioned 
duality seems noteworthy. Not only does the state have the power to set 
norms of conduct with regard to its citizens and individuals within its 
territory, but it also has the responsibility to undertake actions that secure 
the rights of these persons and the area subject to the state against illegal 
infringements16. This is reflected in international law.
1.1.1. Jurisdictional nexuses as arguments justifying competencies 
of the state
The state refers to the territorial scope of legislative jurisdiction using 
the concept of a genuine connection17. In line with its key assumption, 
the argument in favour of granting competence to the state to regulate 
specific aspects of social life is the presence of significant nexuses18 that 
refer to the territory, personal proximity or rights that remain under the 
protection of the state19.
15 Łoś-Nowak, supra note 12, at 196.
16 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 152.
17 Wasiński, supra note 11, at 64; Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 146. The theory of the 
genuine connection was reflected in the Nottebohm case, where it was indicated: 
“A State cannot claim that the rules it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition 
by another State unless it has acted in conformity with this general aim of making 
the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual’s genuine connection with the 
State which assumes the defence of its citizens by means of protection as against 
other States. The requirement that such a concordance must exist is to be found in 
the studies carried on in the course of the last thirty years upon the initiative and under 
the auspices of the League of Nations and the United Nations. It explains the provision 
which the Conference for the Codification of International Law, held at The Hague 
in 1930, inserted in Article I of the Convention relating to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws, laying down that the law enacted by a State for the purpose of determining 
who are its nationals ‘shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent 
with international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard 
to nationality’. In the same spirit, article 5 of the convention refers to criteria of the indi-
vidual’s genuine connections for the purpose of resolving questions of dual nationality 
which arise in third states” – Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment of April 6th, 
1955, I.C.J. Reports 1955.
18 Wasiński, supra note 11, at 61; Knox, Legislative, supra note 11, at 102; Gabriel Hallevy, 
A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law 90–91 (Springer 2010).
19 Wasiński, supra note 11, at 61.
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A competence based on a nexus in the form of a territory of a giv-
en state should be considered fundamental20. The territory is the most 
durable and unambiguous determinant of the limits of state authority. 
It does not usually undergo any transformations and is unambiguously 
defined in space. Considering values such as legal certainty or presumed 
familiarity with norms, it should be assumed that, as a rule, the law in 
force within a given territory is the law introduced by the governing 
state. This approach is reflected in international law, which recognises the 
precedence of the territoriality principle over the principle of personality. 
However, the said precedence is not related to the hierarchical order of 
rules, but has a functional character instead21. It introduces only a certain 
rebuttable presumption of state competencies in this regard, thus serving 
as a starting point for resolving competence disputes22. As long as no rel-
evant evidence to the contrary is furnished, determining in a given case 
that one of the principles introducing solely extra-territorial validity of 
a norm is applicable, the presumed validity of a norm that is relevant in 
terms of territory is binding23. This does not mean in any way that the 
territoriality principle constitutes an overriding jurisdictional rule, but 
that in the course of the discourse it ought to be the prime consideration 
due to praxeological reasons.
When referring the above to the competencies related to setting 
norms that derive from sovereignty, one ought to note that here the ter-
ritory is not as much a direct object for which the powers are exercised, 
but solely a criterion for determining the category of social situations 
regulated by the state which has authority over the said territory. Thus, 
one can distinguish the first category of behaviour for which the state 
has the power to set standards, i.e., any behaviour performed within the 
20 Kratochwil, supra note 3, at 84.
21 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 271; Florian Jessberger, W. Kaleck, Concurring Criminal 
Jurisdictions under International Law, The European Centre for Constitutional and 
Human Rights (ECCHR), 4, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/documents/publications/legal- 
opinions/articles/the-responsibility-to-investigate-international-crimes.html?file=tl_
files/Dokumente/Universelle%20Justiz/Expert%20Opinion%20Concurrent%20
Jurisdictions%20en.pdf; General principles of international criminal law, ICRC Advisory 
Service on International Humanitarian Law, 4, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/ 
2014/general-principles-of-criminal-icrc-eng.pdf.
22 Knox, A Presumption, supra note 11, at 356.
23 Ludwik Ehrlich, Suwerenność a morze w prawie międzynarodowym [Sovereignty and 
the Sea in International Law] 77 (1961).
The state’s power and its limitation
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territory of the state regardless of the actor24. Importantly, this pertains 
to the behaviour of an individual and not the result or any other conse-
quential condition, since only behaviour is subject to standardisation.
The second category of nexuses refers to the personal proximity be-
tween the individual who exercises his or her behaviour and the state. 
In essence, the validity of a norm is determined here based on legal per-
sonality25. The attribute of sovereignty, which is assigned to the state as 
a whole, implies a presumption that the state has a sovereign competence 
over individual persons derived from the very fact that a person belongs 
to the state. Thus, the analysed proximity can have a formal character and 
comes down to the fact that a given person is recognised as a citizen of 
the forum state26, yet it can also refer to a factual relationship27 – interna-
tional law does not provide an unambiguous standard in this regard. In 
both cases, it constitutes a determinant of the existence of a given state’s 
competence to standardise its actions.
Consequently, it can be said that the state has the right to exercise 
competencies in respect of that person regardless of his or her location. 
In this regard, the citizen of state Y somewhat extends the competen-
cies derived from the sovereignty of state Y to include the behaviour 
performed by that person within the borders of state X that he or she 
is travelling across. At the same time, such a person enters a territory 
where state X exercises its competencies, which are also derived from 
its sovereignty. In this context, a conflict of competence may arise based 
on the sovereignty of both states and consist in a power to create norms 
that regulate the said person’s conduct.
The third of the distinguished categories of nexuses that justify the 
state’s claims to standardisation of specific matters is the nature of a legal 
right occurring in a given social situation. As noted above, the notion 
of competence, which is based on sovereignty, should be understood as 
not only the power to standardise given aspects of social life, but also 
the duty to take steps to ensure protection of legal rights of the state and 
24 Anthony Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship and Criminal Law, in: Philosophical Foundations 
of Criminal Law 143 (Anthony Duff & Suart Green ed., Oxford University Press 2011).
25 Władysław Czapliński, Anna Wyrozumska, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne. 
Zagadnienia systemowe [Public International Law. System Issues] 239–245 (2014); 
Białocerkiewicz, supra note 12, at 229–238; Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 90.
26 Czapliński &Wyrozumska, supra note 25, at 239–254; Duff, supra note 24, at 141.
27 Hallevy, supra note 18, at 92.
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the persons who are subjected to the state due to their citizenship or the 
fact that they reside within its territory28 and universal legal rights. This 
aspect of sovereignty is referred to by public international law as respon-
sibility or a duty to protect29. In this approach, the state’s sovereignty will 
serve as the grounds for a claim that state Y has the competence to regulate 
the behaviour of citizens of state X to the extent that they pertain to the 
legal rights protected by the state Y. Here, one ought to distinguish legal 
rights whose carriers remain within the territory of state Y30, legal rights 
of the citizens of the state Y regardless of their location, legal rights of 
national character that describe values significant from the view of proper 
functioning of the state, as well as universal legal rights determined by 
international law. This results from the fact that it is possible to indicate 
a certain catalogue of values protection which falls under the competence 
of each existing sovereign entity. The content of the said catalogue is not 
clearly established and constitutes the subject of disputes, which pertains 
both to the type of rights (dignity, life, health, natural environment)31 
and the type of infringements that may be prohibited and penalised by 
each state32 regardless of the presence of a nexus (torture, slavery). In the 
article presented, the analysed condition, which constitutes, in fact, an 
autonomous jurisdictional nexus, was distinguished from the category 
of other jurisdictional nexuses referred to as classic nexuses.
28 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 75.
29 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 152.
30 See; Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL 2578982, 
at 12 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004); Parrish, supra note 11, at 1681–1683.
31 On the environment as a legal good covered by international criminal law see: Wojciech 
Radecki, Ochrona środowiska w polskim, czeskim i słowackim prawie karnym. Studium 
prawnoporównawcze [Environmental Protection in Polish, Czech and Slovak Criminal 
Law. Comparative Law Study] 136–155 (2013). Interestingly, in the UN system, the 
natural environment is perceived by the prism of human rights and as such protected 
by them – see: Łukasz Boratyński, Ochrona środowiska jako element międzynaro-
dowej ochrony praw człowieka w systemie Narodów Zjednoczonych [Environmental 
Protection as an Element of International Protection of Human Rights in the United 
Nations System], in Wpływ standardów międzynarodowych na rozwój demokracji 
i praw człowieka [Impact of International Standards on the Development of Democracy 
and Human Rights] 52–59 (Jerzy Jaskiernia ed., 2013); Peter G.  Stoett, Human 
Rights, Glocal Ecopolitics, and Contested Landscapes of Sovereignty, in: Negotiating 
Sovereignty and Human Rights. Actors and Issues in Contemporary Human Rights 
Politics 182–191 (Noha Shawki & Meacheline Cox ed., Padstow 2009).
32 On the prohibition of torture as a norm of ius cogens see: The Prosecutor v. Anto 
Furundzija (Trial Judgement), Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ICTY, 10 December 1998.
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1.1.1. The rule of reason as a method of resolving conflicts of 
competence
The above-distinguished categories of nexuses constitute a  potential 
cause of a claim regarding standardisation that may be filed by the state, 
but do not necessarily resolve all such claims. It might be the case that 
a given state limits the spatial scope of validity of specific regulations in 
the context of national law, e.g., with regard to the territory of the state33 
(this issue shall be analysed alongside a method for decoding sanctioned 
norms). At the very same time, a thoroughly reversed situation seems 
highly likely, where several entities are empowered to file prima facie 
claims to standardise a specific social situation. Conflicts may arise in 
this context, resulting in uncertainty regarding norms that are valid for 
individuals who undertake specified activities34. Nexuses may occur si-
multaneously and act in the same direction (a citizen of state X reveals 
its secret acting within a territory of the said state); however, they can 
also be in conflict (by acting within the territory of state X, a citizen of 
state Y violates the personal inviolability of a citizen of state Z)35. In prac-
tice, this oftentimes results in a concurrence of powers. The situation is 
further complicated by the fact that nexuses themselves constitute mere-
ly distinct arguments in the validation discourse – as indicated above, 
the only factors that limit the scope of the state’s powers are the need 
to respect the sovereignty of foreign states and norms of international 
law. The demonstrated existence of jurisdictional nexuses serves in this 
case as an argument for the recognition of the forum state’s powers to 
regulate specific social situations36. It is only a denial of the power to set 
standards that makes a person who is prima facie the addressee of a giv-
en norm incapable of being considered its addressee and thus not bound 
by that norm.
33 Particularly noteworthy is the case of the US, whose legislation prescribes the so-
called presumption against extrajurisdictionality/extraterritoriality, which limits the scope 
of each law exclusively to the territory of the United States, unless that presump-
tion is broken by Congress’s decision – see: Knox, A Presumption, supra note 11, at 
351–396; William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against. Extraterritoriality, 
16 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 85–125 (1998).
34 Knox, A Presumption, supra note 11, at 358; Kranz, Suwerenność, supra note 7, at 131.
35 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 127–128.
36 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 32.
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Considering the above, it seems necessary to determine the norma-
tive criteria for solving the concurrence of competencies to set standards. 
In each case, the actor should have the capacity to identify the norm he 
or she is bound to. Such an assessment must be possible ex ante, not 
later than upon the start of the behaviour. Otherwise, the norm will 
not be able to affect the behaviour of the perpetrator and, consequently, 
its fundamental function will not be fulfilled. The truth is that in practice, 
the problem of the transnational validity of norms takes on meaning 
only when a sanctioning norm or repressive administrative norms37 are 
actualised, when each of the interested states makes effort to prove that 
the norms binding in a given case have been set up by its legislative 
body. This seems incompatible with the postulate of legal certainty and 
also violates the principle of punishing for behaviour incompatible with 
the norm of conduct. An individual who undertakes specific activities 
should be capable of identifying norms he or she is bound to as early 
as at the time of the act. The optimal solution here would be to indi-
cate strict rules for determining the validity or the invalidity of a given 
norm and eliminating any doubt that may arise in this regard. Depending 
on the nature of normative expressions, there are various methods of 
determining the contents of a legally binding provision. In some cases, 
particularly where a given standard-setting expression is derived from 
civil law, the problem of concurring norms, which results from a concur-
rence of competencies to set standards, is solved through the commonly 
accepted conflict of law rules as described in private international law38. 
Nevertheless, public law lacks relevant conflict of law rules, whereas the 
issue of concurrent legislative jurisdictions must be solved by referring 
to the general principles of international law.
In the event of concurrent legislative jurisdictions, “the rule of rea-
son”39 serves as the starting point for determining the method of defining 
37 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 24–25.
38 However, it is important to point out the doubts as to the content of the conflict of 
law rules referred to herein. Firstly, not all of them are universally accepted by the 
international community. Secondly, they appear to limit the scope of applicability of 
the standard rather than its validity. From a criminal liability perspective, however, the 
dilemma is not relevant, and it is therefore not necessary to carry out a comprehensive 
analysis in this regard. – see: Wasiński, supra note 11, at 65.
39 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 143. See: Michał Płachta, Jurysdykcja państwa w sprawach 
karnych wobec cudzoziemców [Jurisdiction of the State In Criminal Cases against 
Foreigners], 111/112 Studia Prawnicze 116–122 (1992); Doyle, supra note 2, at 5.
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the limits of legislative jurisdiction. The rule allows one to specify the 
scope of legislative jurisdiction by means of self-limitation of states em-
powered to regulate specific relations with consideration of the rule of 
mutual respect40 in international relations. The basic assumption of this 
rule is the existence of a possibility to determine the validity (or strength, 
for that matter) of a nexus between the regulated behaviour and the state 
that lays claim to standardisation. Thus, interests of individual entities 
concerned about the standardisation are at stake here, resulting in an 
acceptance of the legislative jurisdiction of one of these entities, while 
that of the other becomes denied41. This, in turn, renders the norm of the 
state whose power was denied invalid.
The rule of reason constitutes a general principle of international 
law42, which can be interpreted based on other commonly recognised 
basic principles. Thus, the rule of reason may be regarded as one of the 
regulations listed in the catalogue provided for in Article 38 of the Statute 
of the ICJ, consequently, a norm of international law43. The rule of rea-
40 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 136–137.
41 Wasiński, supra note 11, at 64; Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 137.
42 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 178–179. The argument put forward by Judge Gerald 
Fitzmaurice in the justification for the separate sentence in Barcelona Traction also 
seems to be in favour of the above solution: “It is true that, under present conditions, 
international law does not impose hard and fast rules on States delimiting spheres of 
national jurisdiction in such matters (and there are, of course, others – for instance, in 
the fields of shipping, ‘anti-trust’ legislation, etc.), but leaves States a wide discretion 
in the matter. It does, however, (a) postulate the existence of limits – though in any 
given case it may be for the tribunal to indicate what these are for the purposes of that 
case; and (b) involve for every State an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint 
as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases of having a foreign 
element, and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining 
to, or more appropriately exercisable by, another State” – see: Barcelona Traction (Belg. 
v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Separate Opinion in the Judgment of Feb. 5).
43 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, the Art. 38: 
“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general 
or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b.  in-
ternational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 
59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This pro-
vision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, 
if the parties agree thereto.” The doctrine of international law assumes that the above 
calculation is a closed catalogue of sources of international law. This is related to 
the so-called “compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ”, which is the result of the will of the 
parties but expressed in abstracto. More on this topic: Renata Szafarz, Obowiązkowa 
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son ought to be treated as an outcome of a joint interpretation of four 
principles of international law, whose binding status is beyond doubt: 
the principle of non-intervention, the equity principle, the principle of 
proportionality and the prohibition of abuse of law – combined with the 
requirement of legally relevant nexuses discussed above44. Nonetheless, 
none of them constitutes a precise directive of conduct. This translates 
into the general rule of reason, which shapes only a certain interpretive 
horizon without defining the exact limit of the spatial scope of legislative 
jurisdiction.
The first of the indicated principles of international law that comprise 
the general rule of reason is the principle of non-intervention in internal 
affairs of the state45. In a situation where power of state X based on the 
existence of a jurisdictive nexus remains concurrent with the exclusive 
competence of state Y, the latter effectively prevents the said power to be 
exercised by limiting the scope of the legislative jurisdiction of state X. 
This can be easily illustrated by a situation where a citizen of state X le-
gally acquires access to classified information at the disposal of state Y. In 
the above situation, state X has no power to regulate its citizen’s conduct 
even if the said citizen is within the territory of that state.
The principle of non-intervention in the area of exclusive powers is 
dictated by the Charter of the United Nations, whose Article 2(7) states 
as follows: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit 
such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this princi-
ple shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter”46. Moreover, a reference to 
jurysdykcja Międzynarodowego Trybunału Karnego [The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court] 35–36 (1991).
44 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 180.
45 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 144; Simone Zurbuchen, Vattel’s Law of Nations and the 
Principle of Non-Intervention, 31 Grotiana 69–84 (2010). Internal affairs of State X 
should be considered in any situation in which there is no significant nexus between the 
event and State Y at all, or in which the matter belongs to the exclusive competences of 
State X, and thus the fact that any significant nexus for state Y exists does not matter. 
See: Kranz, Suwerenność, supra note 7, at 118; Kranz, Państwo, supra note 7, at 22.
46 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI; Emmanuel 
Y. Benneh, Review of the Law of Non-intervention, 7 Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 140 (1995).
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the exclusive area is also made by the Constitution of UNESCO47 and the 
Pact of the League of Arab States48. The principle is also reflected in the 
case law of the ICJ49, which noted that the principle of non-intervention 
constitutes not only one of the fundamental principles of international 
law but is also irrevocable and immutable – both under a contract and 
through a new practice developed with the agreement of both parties50.
The implications of the recognition of the exclusive area refer ex-
pressly to the scope of norms’ validity. State X will never be able to reg-
ulate those aspects of social life that are within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of state Y.
The second principle that serves as a component of the rule of rea-
son is the equity principle51. The idea of equity is deeply rooted in public 
international law, which is reflected in the contents of individual rulings 
of international courts52. The equity principle is noted as one of the rules 
47 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Constitution 
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 
16 November 1945, the Art. 1.3: “With a view to preserving the independence, integrity 
and fruitful diversity of the cultures and educational systems of the States Members of 
the Organization, the Organization is prohibited from intervening in matters which are 
essentially within their domestic jurisdiction”.
48 Kwiecień, supra note 12, at 110.
49 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S. 
of America). Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986.
50 Nicaragua v. U.S. of America, supra note 49; Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention 
Principle and Humanitarian Interventions under International Law, 7 Int’l Legal Theory 
7 (2001). On differences in the perception of the sphere reserved in individual acts 
of international law see: Kwiecień, supra note 12, at 109–111, 146–151.
51 Varvara Coman, Luciana Boboc, Octavia Steriopol, Equity, Fundamental Principle 
of Law, 4 Contemp. Readings L. & Soc. Just. 462–469 (2012); Ruth Lapidoth, Equity 
in International Law, 22 Isr. L. Rev. 161–182 (1987).
52 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), I.C.J. Reports 1969: “The Court comes next to 
the rule of equity. The legal basis of that rule in the particular case of the delimitation 
of the continental shelf as between adjoining States has already been stated. It must 
however be noted that the rule rests also on a broader basis. Whatever the legal rea-
soning of a court of justice, its decisions must by definition be just, and therefore in that 
sense equitable. Nevertheless, when mention is made of a court dispensing justice or 
declaring the law, what is meant is that the decision finds its objective justification in 
considerations lying not outside but within the rules, and in this field it is precisely a rule 
of law that calls for the application of equitable principles”; Diversion of Water from 
Meuse (Netherlands v. Belgium), P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70 (1937): “It must be concluded, 
therefore, that under Article 38 of the Statute, if not independently of that Article, the 
Court has some freedom to consider principles of equity as part of the international 
law which it must apply”; see also: Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Reports of Judgments, 
Advisory Opinions and Orders, Judgement of April 9th, 1949.
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of law commonly recognised by civilised nations53. Therefore, it belongs 
to the catalogue provided for in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, thus 
emphasising its commonly binding nature. The doctrine of international 
law considers the equity principle in the above meaning in three variants, 
granting or denying each of them the value of a norm of internation-
al law54. Firstly, it is noted that the equity principle can be treated as 
a norm that further specifies other regulations, since it is a distinctive 
interpretive directive. In this view, equity is not contrasted with the law, 
as in the case of decisions made ex aequo et bono, but becomes an im-
manent part of the system (equity infra legem)55. Secondly, the equity 
principle is considered a method for eliminating loopholes, allowing 
one to avoid a situation where in the absence of an expressis verbis rule 
of international law it is possible to settle an atypical case and to avoid 
a decision declared non liquet56 (praeter legem)57 by referring to the eq-
uity principle. Thirdly, the equity principle is sometimes considered an 
instrument that limits the application of the provisions of law and allows 
adopting a contra legem58 interpretation. In the above case, the issue lies 
not in the application of law but in disabling the use of its norms. In the 
context of the analysed rule of reason, the first two functions of the equity 
rule, namely, equity infra legem and equity praeter legem, seem signifi-
cant. Here, the equity rule constitutes an interpretive directive that allows 
one to determine the scope of the extra-territorial validity of regulations. 
Thanks to it the interests of individual entities that remain in dispute can 
be weighed and, thus, a decision that takes account (to a relevant extent) 
of the interests of all the parties involved can be issued. The subject with 
the power to standardise is the state which, in relation to the equity rule, 
has a stronger claim to setting standards in a given aspect of life.
The third component of the rule of reason is the principle of pro-
portionality. Under public international law, it constitutes an instrument 
that allows interests of individual entities that remain in dispute to be 
53 Subir K. Chattopadhyay, Equity in International Law: Its Growth and Development, 
5  Ga.  J.  Int’l & Comp. L. 392 (1975); F.  Francioni, Equity in International Law…; 
Czapliński & Wyrozumska, supra note 25, at 138–142.
54 Mark W. Janis, The Ambiguity of Equity in International Law, 9 Brook. J. Int’l L. 12 (1983)
55 Lapidoth, supra note 51, at 173.
56 Lapidoth, supra note 51, at 180; Chattopadhyay, supra note 53, at 397.
57 Lapidoth, supra note 51, at 173.
58 Lapidoth, supra note 51, at 174.
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weighed with regard to their significance. It is based on weighing indi-
vidual elements that are assessed in terms of their significance59. Where 
in the case of the equity rule the reference point applied in the assess-
ment is equity in itself, when it comes to proportionality, the weights 
of individual interests or means are compared, revealing whether they 
are proportional to each other60. Viewed in this light, the principle of 
proportionality implies an order to adjust means to the objectives to be 
attained (the principle of adequacy of means, the principle of purpose)61. 
With respect to jurisdictive legislation, the principle of proportionality 
resolves itself to limiting the scope of competence of the state, since  there 
is no need to set standards for specific aspects of social life62. In this case, 
the validity of norms would serve no purpose. In accordance with the 
principle of proportionality, it can be claimed that regardless of the way in 
which a given regulation meets the requirements of proportionality to the 
extent it standardises behaviour performed within the state borders, ex-
tending the scope of the norm beyond the territory of the said state is an 
infringement of international law. In this sense, the principle of propor-
tionality constitutes a directive that orders an interpretation of national 
law that would allow the interpreted norms to fulfil their objectives and 
remain within its limits. This can be exemplified by the provisions of the 
construction law, energy law and road safety standards. Even if the word-
ing of the very act does not specify if it is binding only within the territory 
of state X, the scope of its validity should be limited under the principle 
59 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 148.
60 Ulf Linderfalk, Towards a More Constructive Analysis of the Identity of Special Regimes 
in International Law – The Case of Proportionality, 2 Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. L. 857 
(2013).
61 Paul Loftus, The Rise and Rise of Proportionality in Public International Law, 1 S. Cross 
U.L. Rev. 165 (1997); J. Beatson indicates that proportionality understood by EU law 
means: “reasonable relationship between the achieved and the means used to achieve 
it” – cit. for Loftus, supra note 61, at 181. Such proportionality should be distinguished 
from other meanings of the proportionality in penal law, including international penal 
law, which refers to the relation between the infringement of a particular prohibition 
and the sanction that is likely to violate it. See: Venus G. Baghi, T.R. Maruthi, The 
Principle of Proportionality in International Criminal Law, Acta U. Danubius Jur. 5–16 
(2011); Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 
102 Am. J. Int’l L. 753 (2008); Justyna Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, Zasada proporcjon-
alności w prawie Wspólnot Europejskich [The Principle of Proportionality in the Law of 
European Communities] 33–34 (2007).
62 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 148.
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of international law discussed above. The principle of proportionality and 
the equity rule share some common features63 – in both cases, interests of 
entities that claim the power to set standards are weighed. Nevertheless, 
it is vital to adopt different views in the assessment.
The fourth element of the rule of reason is the prohibition of abuse 
of law. This concept introduces a prohibition against misusing one’s pow-
ers. It has been adopted by the doctrine of public international law based 
on private law64 and allows actions taken by the state, though within the 
limits of the law, to be blocked if they pursue objectives unacceptable in 
the light of internationally accepted values65. This norm is vague as well. 
Neither the case law of international courts nor the doctrine succeeded 
in developing commonly accepted criteria that would allow determining 
if, in a given situation, powers were abused and the principle of interna-
tional law infringed. It is indicated that abuse of law may consist of bad 
faith of the actor, improper (unacceptable) purpose of the action, taking 
facts irrelevant to the case under consideration and the irrational nature 
of one’s decision66. Such abuse can be exemplified by setting up norms 
valid outside the borders of a given state, whose actual intent, despite 
referring to one of the legally relevant nexuses (territory, citizenship, legal 
right), is to violate another state’s interests.
The four principles of international law discussed above, which com-
prise the rule of reason, consequently limit the competencies of the state 
arising under sovereignty that determines the scope of legislative juris-
diction. In this regard, the rule of reason has the status of a metanorm Nm, 
which further specifies the spatial validity of all other legal norms. Setting 
norms whose content transgresses thus determined limits ought to be 
63 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at150.
64 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 150–151.
65 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 151. See also: Georg Scharzenberger, Uses and abuses 
of the “Abuse of Rights” in International Law, 42 Transactions Year 147–179 (1956); 
Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age, 47 McGill L.J. 397–411 
(2001–2002); the author cites numerous examples of the jurisprudence of international 
tribunals, treaties and statements of academics in which the principle of non-abuse of 
the law has been invoked.
66 Graham D.S. Taylor, The Content of the Rule against Abuse of Rights in International 
Law, 46 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 331 (1972–1973); United States (Chattin) v. United Mexican 
States, 22 A.J.I.L. 667 (Mexico-U.S. General Claims Comm’n) (1928) p. 282–312; 
Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) Merits, 
I.C.J. Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Judgment of 12 April 1960.
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considered an infringement of international law (the sovereignty of other 
states protected under international law), which makes them invalid.
1.2. The limits of ius puniendi
The setting of penal norms in the broad sense is to some extent also 
related to exercising powers that comprise ius puniendi. This term is 
used to refer to competencies of the state to shape the domestic criminal 
law in a way that allows its objectives to be executed67. In this regard, 
Western legal culture distinguishes the following functions: justice func-
tion, protective function, guarantee function and compensatory func-
tion68. Therefore, the state has the right to punish the wrong due to the 
society’s need to satisfy its sense of justice, in the name of which the state 
applies ius puniendi69. It exercises the ius puniendi to protect the people 
from criminal acts that it considers hazardous and harmful70. It specifies 
the response to the wrong and determines categories of conduct merit-
ing condemnation. In this way the potential perpetrator knows which 
behaviour he or she can be punished for71. It shapes the mechanisms 
that allow the perpetrator to remedy the wrong inflicted on the society72. 
67 Michael E. Bayles, Principles of Law. A Normative Analysis 281 (Springer 1987).
68 On the functions of criminal law: Fletcher, supra note 3, at 30; Jan Jodłowski, Zasada 
prawdy materialnej w postępowaniu karnym. Analiza w perspektywie funkcji prawa kar-
nego [The Principle of Material Truth in Criminal Proceedings. Analysis in the Perspective 
of Criminal Law Functions] 248–312 (2015). See also: Christopher W. Mullins, Dawn 
L. Rothe, The Ability of the International Criminal Court to Deter Violations of International 
Criminal Law: A Theoretical Assessment, 10 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 776–784 (2010); Wallace 
M. Rudolph, Punishment or Cure: the Function of Criminal Law, 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 543 
(1980–1981); Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg, Tali Gal, Restorative Criminal Justice, 34 
Cardozo L. Rev. 2324 (2012–2013); Peer Stolle, Tobias Singelnstein, On the Aims 
and Actual Consequences of International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes, in: 
International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes 38–56 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al. eds., 
Springer 2007).
69 Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 261; Bayles, supra note 67, at 285; David Wood, 
Retributive and Corrective Justice, Criminal and Private Law, 48 Scandinavian Stud. 
L. 545, 547 (2005).
70 Rudolph, supra note 68, at 550; Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 254; Bayles, supra 
note 67, at 282.
71 Anthony Duff, Retributive Punishment – Ideals and Actualities, 25 Isr. L. Rev. 422, 
431 (1991); Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 270.
72 Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 68, at 2321; Kate E. Bloch, Reconceptualizing 
Restorative Justice, 7 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 203 (2010); Jodłowski, supra 
note 68, at 272;
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By achieving the above-described objectives, the state protects specific 
legal rights of the victim, the perpetrator or the society as a collective, 
which are oftentimes in opposition to each other.
1.2.1. Exercising criminal law functions as the essence of ius puniendi
In the view of substantive criminal law norms, execution of the right to 
punish consists in setting up binding prohibitions or orders requiring 
a given conduct subject to penalty. A question arises as to how the scope 
of validity of the said norms is formed if analysed in the framework of 
the scope of ius puniendi – i.e., the power to execute criminal law func-
tions. When analysing the above against the issues of liability for crimes 
committed abroad one ought to note that the value attributed by a given 
society to specific legal rights under legal protection is culturally condi-
tioned73. Actions that constitute an infringement of basic moral norms for 
one culture group remain acceptable for another. This pertains both to 
the behaviour of individuals themselves and to the forms of response 
to this behaviour presented by the state. Hence, to determine the limits 
of the right to punish, it seems necessary to analyse individual criminal 
law functions in the context of crimes committed abroad.
The first of the distinguished functions of criminal law is to ensure 
a proper standard of protection over social values; this takes place under 
criminal law by subjecting infringements of norms by individuals to 
a penal sanction. In this regard, criminal law serves a regulatory func-
tion by determining not as much the manner of handling values but the 
category of unacceptable behaviour that may trigger a penal response. 
Thus, it is not as much legal rights per se that are protected but norms of 
conduct, which as a rule are derived from other areas of law. To some 
extent, this is reflected in a division into sanctioned norms and sanc-
tioning norms.
The above described protective goal is pursued in three areas, namely, 
general positive prevention, general negative prevention and individual 
prevention. In the light of the subject of this paper, the first of the in-
dicated aspects seems particularly significant and is thus given further 
consideration.
73 See e.g.: Jeremy S.K. Chan, Cultural Issues and Crime, 12 SAcLJ 1–25 (2000).
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The notion of general prevention in a positive approach is applied 
to the impact of criminal law norms on society, leading to the inter-
nalisation of a specific value system protected by law74 by members of 
the society. Hence, a socially accepted standard of handling legal rights 
is formed, infringement of which ought to trigger a social condemna-
tion. An individual does not undertake conduct that violates legal rights, 
since he or she is aware of their value. General prevention in a negative 
approach has an impact on society at large as well, though here, the 
decisive factor that affects the attitude of individual persons is fear of 
punishment75. The potential perpetrator restrains himself or herself from 
conduct that leads to an infringement of legal rights because he or she 
wants to avoid the pain that might be inflicted on her for this reason. 
Both aspects of general prevention are focused on future events, affect-
ing the motivational processes in an individual76. In this context, the 
regulatory aspect of criminal law norms is noticeable, since the essence 
of general prevention is to shape specific social attitudes in a general 
way. Here, the basic message addressed to the foreign society is: “Should 
the perpetrator engage in X behaviour, the court of the forum state im-
poses a punishment on the said perpetrator provided that there is no 
obstruction of justice.” In the event that spatial validity of the norm is 
not limited, it is formulated even in a situation where the objective of the 
legislator of the forum state is solely to address the message to its own 
society. At the same time, in many cases the forum state does not have 
the standard-setting power.
Apart from protecting rights, the right to punish is also exercised 
with the intent to satisfy the society’s sense of justice, which is referred 
to by the doctrine of criminal law as exercising the justice (retributive) 
function77. In this regard, penal norms allow for the inflicting of a spe-
74 Manuel Atienza, Juan R. Manero, A Theory of Legal Sentences 122–123 (Springer 
1996); Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 255; Bayles, supra note 67, at 284.
75 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, in: What is Justice? 
274 (University of California Press 1971) (1957): “Obedience of the commands of the 
law is achieved through fear of the sanction”. Also: Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 255; 
Bayles, supra note 67, at 282; Atienza & Manero, supra note 74, at 122; Rudolph, supra 
note 68, at 551.
76 Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 254–255; Stanisław Ehrlich, Dynamika norm [The 
Dynamics of Norms] 204 (1988); Bayles, supra note 67, at 284; Darley, Carlsmith 
& Robinson, supra note 4, at 165.
77 Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 260; Bayles, supra note 67, at 285.
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cific pain on the perpetrator as a recompense for the wrong done. The 
justice function is rooted in the instinct for revenge, which once satis-
fied, allows one to regain the sense of balance unsettled by the crime 
perpetrated. Both the way and the extent to which this function is ex-
ercised are culturally conditioned. By exercising ius puniendi, the state 
exercises the administration of justice in the name of its own society. 
In this perspective, the criminal law response ought to take place in all 
cases where the perpetrator’s behaviour upset the social balance to such 
an extent that restoration of that balance requires imposing a criminal 
penalty on the perpetrator78.
Criminal law also serves a guarantee function, which imposes on an 
entity who has the capacity to exercise ius puniendi an obligation to shape 
criminal law norms in a way that allows an individual to identify a spe-
cific behaviour at the moment when he or she undertakes to perform it 
as a potential subject of criminal liability79. In the view of criminal law, 
all conduct not specified as prohibited ought to be considered licit. The 
guarantee function of criminal law is expressed by the Roman principle 
nullum crimen sine lege that institutes a prohibition against imposing 
a penalty for an act not described as a crime under the law in force, which 
as a rule ought to be in writing80.
The contemporary concept of criminal law is also focused on neu-
tralising a conflict between the perpetrator and the victim resulting from 
the committed crime81. The above function, referred to as a compensatory 
function or a conciliatory function, is consistent with the paradigm of 
restorative justice, which has an increasingly strong effect on the shape 
of penal provisions82. By exercising the right to punish, the state ought to 
78 Bayles, supra note 67, at 286.
79 Fletcher, supra note 3, at 12; Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 270. Interestingly, in the 
Anglo-Saxon literature, the guarantee function is precisely connected with the justice 
function: “Weak retributivism has two basic principles. (1) Only persons who have com-
mitted criminal acts may be punished. (2) Punishment is permissible only in proportion 
to the wrong done.” – Bayles, supra note 67, at 286.
80 Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive 
Development of Law?, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1008 (2004); Franz von Liszt, The Rationale 
for the Nullum Crimen Principle, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1010 (September 2007); Jodłowski, 
supra note 68, at 270.
81 Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 68, at 2318; Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 271–272.
82 According to H. Dancig-Rosenberg, T. Galt: “The restorative justice approach focuses, 
therefore, on three questions: Who has been harmed; what are their resulting needs; 
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create conditions so that it is possible to take into account the interests 
of the victim as an entity equal to the perpetrator in the process of ad-
ministering justice. Thus, the wronged person ought to have the broadest 
possible effect on the shape of the criminal liability to be incurred by the 
one who committed the crime.
1.1.2. Sovereignty and human rights as limiting factors of ius puniendi
The above understanding of ius puniendi, identified with the state’s power 
to implement objectives of criminal law, is limited by a number of con-
ditions. Here, one ought to subject them to detailed systematic analysis 
and assign them to two factors that have a limiting effect on state powers. 
Considering the nature of ius puniendi, which is a power to draw negative 
consequences against the perpetrator based on former acts, which at 
the same time affects the future behaviour of individuals and shapes the 
norm of conduct the entire society is bound to, one can note here two 
major levels of conflict. On the one hand, criminal law may affect a for-
eign state’s social organisation in the broad sense, while on the other it 
may interfere with the individual’s freedom if he or she is the perpetrator 
of a given conduct. In the former case, it may result in an infringement of 
the sovereignty of another entity, whereas in the latter – in a violation 
of human rights.
Exercising ius puniendi may give rise to a conflict between two sov-
ereign entities in a situation where several states claim to impose punish-
ment or to standardise a conduct subject to criminal law valuation. This 
is because the forum state strives to exercise the right to punish in respect 
of the perpetrator who executes a behaviour that falls under the authority 
of another entity. Oftentimes, it has strong rights to both standardise the 
perpetrator’s conduct and to impose the punishment for the crime. These 
“clashes of sovereignty” will be discussed below in details.
The direct result of exercising powers that comprise the right to pun-
ish is also an imposition of a pain specified by law on an individual as 
a response to the wrong done by the perpetrator. By undertaking actions 
and who is responsible for meeting those needs” – Dancig-Rosenberg&Gal, supra 
note 68, at 2318; see also: Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 272; Fletcher, supra note 3, 
at 36–39.
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to satisfy the social sense of justice or to protect legal rights violated by 
the prohibited act, the state should take into account also the perpetra-
tor’s interest. In the view of international law, the minimum standard 
valid in this regard is determined by a group of norms referred to as the 
international human rights protection system83.
The human right protection system has a binding effect on states. 
In view of the standardisation of the criminal justice apparatus, its key 
objective is to determine a standard to be met by the state legislation to 
ensure proper protection of an individual’s fundamental values84. The 
norms it consists of serve a twofold purpose in the process of defining 
the limits of ius puniendi. On the one hand, they authorise the forum state 
to criminalise specific behaviour performed abroad even at the expense 
83 It should be noted that in the present state of law it is not actually possible to identify 
one universally acceptable catalogue of “human rights”. They should be treated rather 
as a set of fundamental values, which can then form the basis for the formulation 
of the rights that all people have. See: Bartosz Liżewski, Operacjonalizacja ochro-
ny praw człowieka w porządku Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka. Studium 
teoretycznoprawne [Operationalization of Human Rights Protection in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Studies From the Perspective of Legal Theory] 67 (2015); 
Hathaway, supra note 10, at 146; Cohen, supra note 10, at 178–179; Jack Donnelly, 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice 22–33 (Cornell University Press 2013). 
Internationally recognized human rights as interpretative directives are also indicated 
by the ICC Statute; even those acts do not indicate a catalogue of those rights – see: 
Daniel Sheppard, The International Criminal Court and “Internationally Recognized 
Human Rights”: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, 10 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 
46 (2010). Some scholars point to the customary nature of human rights. Such ap-
proach, in the face of adopting a conception of value to the individual, does not deserve 
approval – see: Birgit Schlütter, Developments in Customary International Law: Theory 
and the Practice of the International Court of Justice and the International ad hoc 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia 42–46 (Brill-Nijhoff 2010); Cohen, supra 
note 10, at 166; Andrzej Sakowicz, Zasada ne bis in idem w prawie karnym w ujęciu 
paneuropejskim [The Principle of Ne Bis In Idem in Criminal Law in a Pan-European 
Perspective] 164 (2011); Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as 
Customary Law 210 (Oxford University Press 1989). This approach was reflected in 
Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Separate Opinion in the Judgment of 
Feb. 5): “Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from 
the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and 
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery 
and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have en-
tered into the body of general international law (Reservations to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 
1951, p. 23); others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or qua-
si-universal character.”
84 Tomasz Iwanek, Zbrodnie ludobójstwa i  zbrodnie przeciwko ludzkości w  prawie 
międzynarodowym [Crimes of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in International 
Law] 91 (2015); Jackson, supra note 10, at 126; Hathaway, supra note 10, at 147.
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of limiting other states’ sovereignty85. The fact of compromised human 
rights may serve as a reason for extending ius puniendi onto specific cat-
egories of acts to ensure proper protection of human rights, which may 
become infringed as a result of a crime. In this regard, human rights con-
stitute a positive responsibility86. On the other hand, human rights limit 
the scope of this power in a way that prevents the right to punish from 
being excessively extended and, consequently, in a way that prevents the 
individual’s rights from being violated, since the right to punish can be 
exercised only to the extent that it does not violate human rights itself.
In both cases, the reference point is the individual perpetrator’s act, 
assessed from the view of possible imposition of a criminal penalty on 
the said perpetrator. The key issue here does not pertain to the matter 
of executing the human rights standard as a whole but is focused on 
protecting fundamental values described in the first-generation human 
rights87. These rights will be infringed by excessive criminalisation or 
a lack of criminalisation of certain conducts. They protect values derived 
directly from human dignity88, which thus gain the status of international 
legal rights. The said rights are common, innate, inalienable, inviolable, 
natural and indivisible89. Neither their existence nor the obligation to 
85 This is especially evident in the context of offenses committed by public officials of 
foreign countries (e.g. the Pinochet case) see: Clunan, supra note 10, at 10; Sakowicz, 
supra note 83, at 164.
86 Iwanek, supra note 84, at 91; Jakub Czepek, Zobowiązania pozytywne państwa w sfer-
ze praw człowieka pierwszej generacji na tle Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka 
[State’s Positive Commitments in the Field of Human Rights of the First Generation 
Against the Background of the European Convention on Human Rights] 16–18 (2014); 
Evelyne Schmid, Taking Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Seriously in International 
Criminal Law 50 (Cambridge University Press 2015).
87 Raha L. Zohadi, The Generations of Human Rights, 1 Int’l Stud. J. 99–101 (2004).
88 See: UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 
1948, 217 A (III), the 1 Art.; UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, the 10 Art.; 
UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249 (The 
Preamble); UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1465, (The Preamble); European Union, Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02, the 1 Article.
89 Donnelly, supra note 83, at 23; Robert Andrzejczuk, Prawa człowieka w  świetle 
uwarunkowań kulturowych i prawnych [Human Rights in the Light of Cultural and 
Legal Conditions] 139–152 (2011). It is important to point out, however, that this is not 
a universal approach – there are also concepts that explicitly point to the limited nature 
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respect them is dependent on the will of states since they exist objectively 
regardless of the contents of norms. Acts of international law only con-
firm the need to protect them and still give rise to no powers of an indi-
vidual90. Being of minor significance, the second- and third-generation 
rights remain uncovered in these considerations. Importantly, in some 
situations, particularly where the state’s actions are aimed at blocking the 
powers defined by the second- and the third-generation rights, they can 
be subject to the forum state’s criminal law protection as well91.
To sum up the above, there are two aspects of state power, which are 
executed during the process of establishing and enforcing penal law – 
legislative jurisdiction and ius puniendi. Both of them influence the scope 
of spatial validity of penal norms. This issue will be discussed in details 
in the third part of the work.
2. Normative analysis as a method of describing the conditions for 
criminal liability
At present, normative analysis constitutes a basic research instrument92 
used in Polish criminal law science alongside the dogmatic method, al-
lowing conditions for criminal liability to be described within the overall 
of human rights in the sense that their borders determine the possibility of effective 
enforcement – cf. Cohen, supra note 10, at 187–195.
90 Andrzejczuk, supra note 88, at 143.
91 Schmid, supra note 86.
92 Piotr Kardas, O relacjach pomiędzy strukturą przestępstwa a dekodowanymi z prze-
pisów prawa karnego strukturami normatywnymi [On the Relations Between the 
Structure of Crime and Penal Normative Structures], XVI Czasopismo Prawa Karnego 
i Nauk Penalnych 5–6 (2012). The above thesis is evidenced by the growing number 
of publications on criminal law, which are based directly on normative structures, in 
this way explaining the essence of individual dogmatic institutions. See: Piotr Kardas, 
Zbieg przepisów ustawy w prawie karnym. Analiza teoretyczna [The Concurrence of the 
Provisions of the Act in Criminal Law. Theoretical Analysis] 259–293 (2011); Małgorzata 
Dąbrowska-Kardas, Analiza dyrektywalna przepisów części ogólnej kodeksu karnego 
[The Directive’s Analysis of the Provisions of the General Part of the Penal Code] (2012); 
Włodzimierz Wróbel, Zmiana normatywna i zasady intertemporalne w prawie karnym 
[Normative Change and Intertemporal Principles in Criminal Law] (2003); Łukasz Pohl, 
Struktura normy sankcjonowanej w prawie karnym. Zagadnienia ogólne [The Structure 
of the Sanctioned Norm in Criminal Law. General Issues] (2007); Ryszard Dębski, 
Jeszcze o normie prawnokarnej [Once Again about the Penal Norm] in Nauki penalne 
wobec szybkich przemian socjokulturowych. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Mariana 
Filara [Penal Sciences in the Face of Rapid Sociocultural Changes. Anniversary Book 
of Professor Marian Filar] 109–128 (Andrzej Adamski ed. 2012). Michał Królikowski
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structure. Its basic assumption lies in a strict differentiation between 
a  legal provision and a norm93. Provisions are regarded here only as 
standard-setting expressions that can potentially contribute to creating 
a norm. They do not constitute an independent directive of conduct. It 
is only the legal norms interpreted based on these provisions that are 
regarded as complete legal directives that determine how an individual 
should behave94.
Norms are formed based on provisions and other directival expres-
sions (e.g., scientific indications, social rules). These pursue a twofold 
purpose: 1) to determine how one ought to behave in a specific social 
situation, and 2) to constitute a legal assessment pattern of the actor’s 
behaviour95. For instance, when driving a car, the driver is obliged to  
behave in a specific manner, i.e., to drive in the right lane at a specified 
speed with hands on the wheel, etc. The above orders are provided for in 
various provisions of law, yet they make up a single norm that indicates 
how one ought to behave in a given road traffic situation. If an individual 
infringes a binding norm, his or her behaviour ought to be considered 
unlawful96.
Each norm has its scope of validity, scope of applicability and an 
addressee. The notion of validity determines the characteristic of a given 
 defined this trend as “normative dogmatics” – see: Michał Królikowski, Kontekstowa 
teoria (dogmatyki) prawa karnego [Context Theory of the Criminal Law (dogmatic)], 
XLVI Studia Iuridica 185–196 (2006).
93 S.  Ehrlich, supra note 76, at 109–111; Andrzej Grabowski, Prawnicze pojęcie 
obowiązywania prawa stanowionego. Krytyka niepozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa 
[Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law: A Critique of Contemporary Legal 
Nonpositivism] 252 (2009).
94 Christie, supra note 6, at 2–3, 14; S. Ehrlich, supra note 76, at 91.
95 This approach combines two aspects of the standard, distinguished by M. Puig: “Those 
who conceive of a criminal norm as a ‘norm of valuation’ regard it as an expression of 
a value judgment distinguishing what is licit according to criminal law from what is illicit. 
In that sense, article 407 of the Criminal Code is nothing but a judgment about the dis-
value of killing another person. […] The imperative theory, in contrast, regards a criminal 
norm as a norm of determination, that is, as a command or prohibition addressed to 
the citizens. In that sense, the legal order consists of expressions of the legislator’s will 
requiring certain behaviour from the members of the legal community, and its norms are 
obligatory prohibitions the people concerned must comply with.” – Santiago M. Puig, 
Introduccion a  las bases del Derecho penal (1976), cit. for. Atienza&Manero, supra 
note 74, at 121, 129.
96 The above approach seems to correspond with the solution of E. Bulygin, according 
to which the norm is combining the social situation with its legal solution, see: Carlos 
Alchourrón & Eugenio Bulygin, Normative Systems 42 (Springer 1971).
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norm that allows one to determine the likelihood of a situation where 
a given norm will serve as a directive of conduct97. Thus, a behaviour 
that is in conflict with the norm constitutes an infringement of the law. 
The scope of applicability specifies the group of actual situations where 
the norm serves as a pattern of conduct or an assessment pattern. If act 
X is regulated by norm Y, the said norm finds application in the case 
of this particular act98. In this perspective, validity can be described as 
an “existence” of a norm99, while applicability of this norm is described 
as “putting it to use”. The addressee of the norm is an individual obliged 
to behave in line with its instructions. Depending on the nature of the 
norm, it is either each person living in this world (e.g., regarding the 
common abolition of slavery) or a specific group of people characterised 
by a distinctive quality (e.g., members of the Sejm of the Republic of 
Poland regarding the voting procedure).
In the model presented, the inner structure of a norm consists of 
two elements, namely, a hypothesis and a disposition100. A hypothesis 
determines the conditions of the external world that are vital for the 
actualisation of an obligation described in a disposition. Regarding the 
example described above, it ought to be said that, in simple terms, if an 
individual a) is moving in a car, b) on a public road (hypothesis), he or 
she should be a) driving the right lane, b) with the lights on, and c) with 
his or her hands on the wheel (disposition). Importantly, no autonomic 
element of the norm in the form of sanctions was distinguished as part of 
this elaboration. In the presented approach, the responsibility to impose 
a penalty constitutes a disposition of a sanctioning norm addressed to 
the authority. This issue will be subjected to analysis further in the paper. 
A thus described norm constitutes a complex legal construct interpreted 
97 Kelsen, supra note 75, at 267.
98 It should be noted that in the legal sciences there is a distinction between the material 
and procedural possibility of using a standard. It is pointed out by G. Hallevy: “The distinc-
tion between applicability and jurisdiction is not within the exclusive domain of criminal 
law, but it is relevant to all spheres of the law. Applicability of the norm and jurisdiction 
are different terms relating to different legal aspects. Applicability of a norm means the 
subordination of a certain event to a relevant legal norm. If the norm is applicable, the 
event must be judged according to the norm.” – Hallevy, supra note 18, at 82.
99 Kelsen, supra note 75, at 267; Christie, supra note 6, at 11; Eugenio Bulygin, Existence 
of norm, in: Actions, Norms, Values: Discussions with Georg Henrik von Wright 242 
(Georg Meggle ed., New York 1999).
100 S. Ehrlich, supra note 76, at 106–109.
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based on a number of directival expressions101. These expressions have no 
scope of validity or applicability of their own, but remain constituents 
of the norm solely. They are characterised by an attribute called “the 
standard-setting competence”, which identifies the capacity to co-create 
a norm.
Transposing the above considerations to the area of substantive crim-
inal law, one should note that Polish criminal law doctrine102 distinguish-
es, in particular, three103 normative structures that are either reduced or 
further developed depending on the presented concept. These include 
a sanctioned norm, a sanctioning norm and a norm of competence104, 
jointly referred to as penal norms in a broad sense105. Each of them sat-
isfies formal conditions to be given independent status106, since they are 
all characterised both by an individual scope of standard-setting and the 
scope of applicability107, as well as determines its addressees.
101 Reinhold Zippelius, Introduction to German Legal Methods 63–64 (Kirk W.  Junker 
& Matthew Roy trans., Carolina Academic Press 2008); Grabowski, supra note 93, at 253.
102 Reflection on normative structures in Polish penal law was initiated by two works of 
Andrzej Zoll, published in 1990: Andrzej Zoll, O normie prawnej z punktu widzenia prawa 
karnego [On the Legal Norm From the Point of View of Criminal Law], XXIII Krakowskie 
Studia Prawnicze 69–95 (1990); Andrzej Zoll, Karalność i karygodność czynu jako 
odrębne elementy struktury przestępstwa [Penality and Criminality of an Act as Separate 
Elements of the Crime Structure] in Teoretyczne problemy odpowiedzialności karnej 
w polskim oraz niemieckim prawie karnym [Theoretical Problems of Criminal Liability 
in Polish and German Criminal Law] 101–112 (Tomasz Kaczmarek ed., 1990). See 
also: Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 164; Pohl, supra note 92, at 19–48; Piotr 
Kardas, Teoretyczne podstawy odpowiedzialności karnej za przestępne współdziałanie 
[Theoretical Basis of Criminal Liability For Criminal Cooperation] 65–87 (2001).
103 It shall be noted that above conception is not the only one, but it is the most widespread 
in Polish doctrine of criminal law. It explains the relations between a perpetrator and 
a court in a complex way.
104 See: Wróbel, supra note 92, at 28–29; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 171–184; 
Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 269–270.
105 Włodzimierz Wróbel, Struktura normatywna przepisu prawa karnego [Normative 
Structure of the Criminal Law Provision], LV Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny 
i Socjologiczny 94 (1993).
106 Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 173; Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 269–270.
107 Polish doctrine of criminal law generally accepted the view that: “it is useful to in-
troduce the term ‘scope of a usage of a norm’ to denote the class of all these 
situations, after which the addressee of the norm (the person to whom the order is 
addressed) should fulfil the norms of behaviour….] The scope of actions regulated 
by the norm (the scope of normalization of a norm) is, respectively, the class of these 
potential future acts of addressees to which the norm will be applied. [transl. DZ]” – 
Zygmunt Ziembiński, Podstawowe problemy prawoznawstwa [Basic Problems of 
Jurisprudence] 129–131 (1980).
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Essentially, a sanctioned norm can be said to describe the desired 
way of a man’s conduct by referring to situations that can potentially 
occur in the real world. Thus, here, the addressee is an individual108. The 
conjugated sanctioning norm is addressed to the court109. It imposes on 
the latter the obligation to hold a person who infringed a sanctioned 
norm criminally liable. In this view, the role of the sanctioning norm is 
to protect the sanctioned norm against infringement (to sanction these 
infringements). The norm of competence is addressed both to the court, 
thus authorising it to impose a penalty, and to the individual, who is 
hence ordered to submit to the judgement of the court110. The above 
approach is, in essence, an adaptation of Hans Kelsen’s idea, which dif-
fers in that it assumes the scheme was divided into three categories of 
norms. According to the approach of the founder of normativity, “The 
legal norm refers to the conduct of two entities: the citizen, against whose 
delict the coercive measure of the sanction is directed, and the organ that 
is to apply the coercive measure to delict”111. Therefore, Kelsen assumed 
that the responsibility to impose a penalty should be covered by the very 
same norm that pertains to the individual’s responsibility to undertake 
a specific behaviour in a given social situation112.
The thus distinguished normative structures correspond to the dog-
matic definition of a crime that functions in Polish criminal law doctrine, 
according to which the subject of criminal liability is: 1) an act that is 
2) illegal, 3) punishable, 4) socially harmful, and 5) culpable. The above 
definition is referred to as “the structure of the crime” and in fact en-
compasses a brief description of key conditions for establishing criminal 
liability. In this approach, the sanctioned norm is combined with the level 
of the act and illegality – an infringement of the norm allows the crim-
inal illegality to be determined. The sanctioning norm corresponds to 
108 Wróbel, supra note 92, at 66; Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 278; Dąbrowska-Kardas, 
supra note 92, at 177.
109 Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 178; Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 174; 
Wróbel, supra note 92, at 67; Wróbel, supra note 105, at 96.
110 Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 182; Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 278.
111 H. Kelsen: “obedience of the commands of the law is achieved through fear of the 
sanction” – Kelsen, supra note 75, at 274–275.
112 In a similar way the penal norm is described by G. Hallevy: “The criminal norm contains 
two parts: a valid conditional clause and a criminal sanction. Both parts are required to 
identify the criminal norm” – Hallevy, supra note 18, at 16.
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the level of punishability, culpability and fault. The norm of competence 
constitutes a link which ensures that both structures are connected in 
a functional manner113.
All the three norms are functionally conjugated. It seems particularly 
important to emphasise the conjugation between the sanctioned norm 
and the sanctioning norm, which manifests itself in the actualisation 
of a disposition of the sanctioning norm in the event of an aggravated 
infringement of the sanctioned norm. Thus, if an individual who is the 
addressee of sanctioned norm N infringes the norm by means of his 
behaviour, the court who is the addressee of sanctioning norm NS im-
poses a penalty on the individual for the infringement of norm N based 
on norm NS.
Further considerations provide a description of the sanctioned norm 
and the sanctioning norm. The issue of the norm of competence was not 
covered in the article, as a broader analysis of this matter is not vital for 
presenting the main assumptions that underlie the model of interpreting 
norms in an international context.
2.1. Sanctioned norm
A sanctioned norm (N) constitutes a legal rule of conduct that specifies 
the way in which the addressee of the norm ought to behave (disposition) 
in a situation where an actual state provided for in the said norm takes 
place (hypothesis)114. It is called a primary norm115, as it refers directly 
to potential events in the real world and regulates the behaviour of indi-
viduals (in contrast to sanctioning norms and competence norms called 
113 Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, at 17; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 199; 
Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, at 45.
114 Sometimes it is called the norm of the order/prohibition (“norma nakazu/zakazu”). In 
essence, it describes the acceptable degree of exposure of a  legal good (for exam-
ple, acceptable endangerment while driving a car is determined by speed limits, etc.). 
See:Wróbel, supra note 92, at 66; Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 270; Jacek Giezek, 
Narażenie na niebezpieczeństwo oraz jego znaczenie w konstrukcji czynu zabronion-
ego [Exposure to Danger and Its Importance in the Construction of a Prohibited Act], 
50 Przegląd Prawa i Administracji 113–114 (Zdzisław Kegel ed., 2002).
115 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 270; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 134; 
Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, at 37. Sanctioned norm realizes therefore the 
so-called ex-ante function of criminal law, affecting the behaviour of the matter before 
committing the act, see: Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, supra note 4, at 166.
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secondary norms116, which provide a description of certain convention-
al conduct of the body117). It involves a specified order or a prohibition 
against a specific behaviour which, if infringed, might (but does not 
have to) result in a need to impose a penalty on the perpetrator118.
The key objective of the existence of a sanctioned norm is to provide 
the most precise definition of rules of conduct to be observed in contact 
with values protected by law, which are referred to as legal rights119. The 
addressee of a sanctioned norm is only an individual whose conduct 
falls within the legislative jurisdiction under which it was issued. The 
obligation to observe the norm is independent of decisions of any bodies. 
The conflict between the conduct and the content of a norm determines 
whether it serves as a condition for determining its illegal nature. A sanc-
tioned norm also describes the legally relevant piece of social reality, thus 
influencing the first element of the structure of a crime, i.e., the act120. 
Owing to a sanctioned norm, it can be said that behaviour X constitutes 
an act under the criminal law, whereas behaviour Y cannot be considered 
an act121. It allows one to distinguish legally significant conduct of the 
perpetrator from a continuum of his or her life.
The further considerations in this paper were derived from a con-
cept122 according to which a sanctioned norm consists of two categories of 
elements. The first one is a prohibition/order (Z), which serves as its core 
and is derived from a provision that penalises a given behaviour123. The 
116 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 279; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 134.
117 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 275; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 136. “It cre-
ates ‘institutional fact’” – Kratochwil, supra note 3, at 25–28.
118 Wróbel, supra note 92, at 28; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 198; Kardas, Zbieg, 
supra note 92, at 274–275; Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, at 32.
119 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 271; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 134.
120 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 270; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 135; 
Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, at 50.
121 Sometimes in the field of criminal law they are referred to as the “prerequisites” that must 
be fulfilled in order to be able to rely on normalization at all. However, there is no doubt 
that they are normative (they are a pattern) and should therefore be directly related to 
the content of the standard. Their detailed analysis was presented by Ł. Pohl – Pohl, 
supra note 92, at 68–88. See also: Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 271; Dąbrowska-
Kardas, supra note 92, at 175.
122 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 261–262; Pohl, supra note 92, at 19–55.
123 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 274; Pohl, supra note 92, at 60. To some extent, a similar 
point of view was represented by F. Kratochwil, who wrote: “Many directives in rule-form, 
such as the indicative statement printed on the notes of German legal tender that ‘anyone 
who counterfeits notes will be imprisoned for not less than two years’ have to be taken 
as directives in spite of the descriptive phrasing” – Kratochwil, supra note 3, at 73.
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second one consists of directives that ensure adequacy of its content 
(P). These are derived from other areas of law (either national: Pn or for-
eign: Pf)124 or take the form of non-legislative rules derived from life ex-
perience or scientific knowledge125. This model of norm can be described 
by the following formula: N = Z – (Pf + Pn). By specifying individual 
categories of normative expression (elements of norm) that influence the 
contents of a sanctioned norm, it will be possible to specify the scope of 
their competence to set standards and, consequently, to determine the 
content of the binding norm.
Both these elements (Z and P) serve as directival standard-setting 
expressions and not independent norms of conduct – further jointly 
referred to as directives of conduct126. A thus described sanctioned norm 
consists of a general prohibition/order and directives of conduct that 
further specify its contents127. Compared to the directives of conduct, 
a general prohibition/order seems to be weaker and gives way to these 
directives. This can be described as follows: the content of a prohibition 
defined in the criminal law prohibits undertaking any behaviour that 
leads to a specific result S. At the same time, there are directives of con-
duct that allow behaviours X, Y and Z that can potentially lead to the 
same result. Therefore, a sanctioned norm takes on the following form: 
124 Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 195–196.
125 Zoll, O normie, supra note 102, at 80; Jacek Giezek, Przyczynowość oraz przypisanie 
skutku w prawie karnym [Causation and Attributing Effect to Criminal Law], CCXXIX 
Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis 91 (1994); Kazimierz Buchała, Przestrzeganie 
zasad ostrożności – problem bezprawności czy winy [Observance of the Rules of 
Prudence – the Problem of Unlawfulness or Guilt], 209 Państwo i Prawo 89 (1963); 
Kazimierz Buchała, Bezprawność przestępstw nieumyślnych oraz wyłączające je do-
zwolone ryzyko [Unlawfulness of Unintentional Crimes and Allowed Risks Excluding 
Offenses] 122 (1971); Włodzimierz Wróbel, Zagadnienie naruszenia reguł wymaganej 
ostrożności [The Issue of Violation of the Rules of Required Caution], in Orzecznictwo 
sądowe w sprawach karnych. Aspekty europejskie i unijne [Judicial jurisprudence in 
criminal matters. European and EU aspects] 169–181 (Lech Gardocki et al. eds., 2008); 
Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 204–214; Jacek Giezek, Przewidywanie czy-
nu zabronionego oraz zamiar jego uniknięcia jako podmiotowe elementy świadomej 
nieumyślności [Predicting a Prohibited Act and the Intention to Avoid It as Subjective 
Elements of Mens Rea] in Nauki penalne wobec szybkich przemian socjokulturowych. 
Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Mariana Filara [Penal Sciences in the Face of Rapid 
Sociocultural Changes. Anniversary Book of Professor Marian Filar] 137 (Andrzej 
Adamski ed., 2012); Kratochwil, supra note 3, at 73.
126 Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 193–196; Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 271; 
Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, at 38.
127 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 271; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 195; Pohl, 
supra note 92, at 102.
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any behaviour leading to the result S except for behaviour X, Y and Z is 
prohibited. Should the perpetrator of a given behaviour be found to act 
in line with the directive of conduct, it cannot be said that a prohibition 
was violated. Consequently, the sanctioned norm was not infringed and 
no illegal behaviour was committed128. In this view, directives of conduct 
serve as expressions that limit the content of the prohibition expressed 
in the criminal law129.
In this regard, one can see more clearly the difference between a pro-
hibition/order, indefinite and formulated only in general terms, and 
a sanctioned norm in its adequate form, binding in the reality of a given 
case and further defined. Thus, the state introduces a general prohibition 
against/an order to do X, whereas any derogation is determined by direc-
tives of conduct. By taking both elements into account, one can interpret 
the sanctioned norm binding in a given case that can serve as a pattern 
of assessment of the perpetrator’s act from the perspective of illegality.
a. prohibition/order b. prohibition/order and directions of conduct c. sanctioned norm
Particular elements that contribute to the sanctioned norm are not 
autonomous norms of conduct. They have no value of validity, only the 
competence to set standards (a capacity to contribute to a norm). At the 
128 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 271; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 196; 
Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, at 39; Giezek, supra note 114, at 115; Marek Bielski, 
Obiektywna przypisywalność skutku w prawie karnym [Objective Attributability of Effect 
in Criminal Law] 185 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, available at Jagiellonian 
University Library, 2010); Ryszard Dębski, Pozaustawowe znamiona przestępstwa. 
O ustawowym charakterze norm prawa karnego i znamionach typu czynu zabron-
ionego nie określonych w ustawie [Non-Statutory Constituent Elements of Crime. On 
the Statutory Character of Criminal Law Norms and Elements of a Prohibited Act Not 
Specified in the Act] 184 (1995).
129 Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 195.
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same time, they constitute normative expressions issued by individual 
states that have the standard-setting power in this regard. In this view, it 
seems necessary to determine the limits of the said competence to form 
both by means of the very prohibition/order that is its key element and 
by individual directives of conduct that further specify the content of the 
prohibition. Here, one ought to take into account the varying character 
of both standard-setting expressions. While the directive of conduct that 
is solely regulatory corresponds to a normative expression of non-penal 
nature, an order/prohibition of conduct derived from a penal norm re-
flects the regulatory aspect of ius puniendi.
2.2. Sanctioning norm
The content of the sanctioning norm can be described as an order to 
impose the penalty on the perpetrator filed in the court whereby the 
perpetrator is concluded to have breached the sanctioned norm he or 
she is bound to as well as some other conditions of criminality (the age 
of the perpetrator, the place of the act, criminal responsibility, etc.). An 
infringement of a sanctioned norm constitutes, therefore, the first condi-
tion for a penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator by the court – a con-
dition for actualising the disposition of a sanctioning norm130. A formula 
reflecting the composition of a sanctioning norm (NS) could take the 
following form: NS = ~[Z – (Pf + Pn)] + PS1 + PS2 +…+ PSn, where symbols 
PS1, PS2, PSn stand for other circumstances determining the imposition of 
a penalty131. In this view, a sanctioning norm is secondary to a sanctioned 
norm132 as, in essence, it is only a legal instrument that protects a sanc-
130 The breach must be qualified and thus also meet requirements other than the violation 
of the sanctioned standard. They were described in the content of the sanctioning norm, 
which refers to social harmfulness or intent. See: Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 274; 
Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 137–138; Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, 
at 43; Zoll, O normie, supra note 102, at 72.
131 The example of such circumstances may also be the perpetrator’s age – see: Gerhard 
Mueller, Michael Gage, Lenore R. Kupperstein, The Legal Norms of Delinquency. A com-
parative study 10–13 (1969).
132 M. Atienza, citing P. Mir, indicates: “within the sphere of criminal norms, he distinguishes 
between the already mentioned ‘primary’ norms, ‘secondary’ norms (addressed to the 
judge, ordering him to inflict some punishment)” – Atienza & Manero, supra note 74, 
at 124; Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 274; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, 
at 135; Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, at 43.
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tioned norm against infringement133. The content of the sanctioning 
norm becomes embedded into the content of a sanctioned norm, while 
the sanctioning norm strengthens the message of the standard of conduct.
A disposition of the sanctioning norm (an order to impose a penalty) 
is derived from a provision of criminal law134. The norm itself is referred 
to as a criminal norm in the strict sense. Decoding the sanctioning norm 
requires only provisions provided for in legal acts issued by the forum 
state. In principle, these are not made adequate here by referring to for-
eign norms – being pure criminal norms not characterised by the reg-
ulatory aspect, they constitute an expression of a properly discretional 
authority of the state. Nevertheless, even in the case of these norms, their 
contents may be modified in certain ways with regard to the introduc-
tion of a negative condition for establishing liability in the form of the 
requirement of dual criminality135. Should such a requirement be in force 
in a given situation, the actualisation of the disposition of a sanctioned 
norm depends on whether the foreign state views the perpetrator’s be-
haviour as a crime.
133 Zoll, O normie, supra note 102, at 72–73; Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 274; 
Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 135; Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, at 43; 
Giezek, supra note 114, at 113.
134 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 184, p. 275.
135 Otto Lagodny, Possible Ways to Reduce the Double Criminality Requirement: From 
double criminality to double prohibition, European Committee On Crime Problems 
(CDPC), PC-TJ, 2 (2005), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/pc-oc/PC-TJ%20
_2005_%2006%20E%20%20Lagodny%20Poss%20ways%20to%20reduce%20
the%20double%20Crim.pdf; Jonathan O.  Hafen, International Extradition: Issues 
Arising under the Dual Criminality Requirement, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 194 (1992); Note 
on dual criminality, in concreto or in abstracto, European Committee On Crime Problems 
(CDPC), PC-OC, 02 Final 2 (2012), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/pc-oc/
PCOC_documents/PC-OC%20(2012)%202%20Final%20Note%20on%20dual%20
criminality%20in%20concreto%20or%20in%20abstracto.pdf.
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Claims
1. Between regulation and penalization
Despite the fact that it is theoretically possible to make a strict division 
between the right to punish for human conduct and the right to regu-
late human conduct, in practice it proves impossible136. It is somewhat 
hypocritical to claim that state X does not prohibit specific behaviour 
yet imposes a penalty upon each person who engages in such behaviour 
provided that he or she is under its jurisdiction137. One could claim prima 
facie that the right to punish ought to be regarded solely as an imposition 
of a penalty for a specific act regardless of the regulatory aspect. The said 
penalty is imposed based on the principle of territoriality within the 
borders of the forum state. In this regard, it should be mentioned that 
the message addressed to the foreign society has no prohibitive nature 
but reads as follows: “Should the perpetrator engaging in behaviour X 
find him- or herself within the borders of the forum state, he or she 
bears the penalty.” The above interpretation does not deserve to be ac-
cepted, though. Firstly, in this view criminal law does not exercise the 
protective function understood as protecting values, but serves as a mi-
136 M. Bayles, characterizing the criminal law, indicated: “The distinctive features of criminal 
law are strict prohibitions of actions and imposition of harms (possibility of imprison-
ment) on offenders” – Bayles, supra note 67, at 281.
137 Atienza & Manero, supra note 74, at 122.
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gration policy tool. This must give rise to objection given the wording 
of the principle of proportionality. Secondly, taking into account that 
criminal law in a strict sense, being disconnected from the regulato-
ry aspect, sanctions infringements of norms of conduct, it ought to be 
indicated that in the analysed situation it is still vital to determine the 
norms that the perpetrator was bound to at the time of a given act. Their 
validity cannot be reliant on uncertain future circumstances, whereas 
the solution depicted above assumes that a prohibition is not in force 
until the moment of crossing the border. This is due to the fact that if 
one considers a prohibition to be mandatory, while the condition of one’s 
presence within the territory pertains solely to a sanctioning norm, then 
the alleged impact of norms of an order/prohibition on internal relations 
of a foreign state remains valid.
When taken into account, the regulatory aspect of criminal law gives 
rise to significant problems in the process of decoding penal norms. In 
fact, the forum state with its strong right to punish may prove to have no 
legislative jurisdiction. Therefore, one ought to ask whether a state has 
the competence to set a common norm that imposes punishment for, e.g., 
each and every murder illegal under the law that the perpetrator is bound 
to regardless of the source of the said law. This can be depicted as follows:
Each perpetrator of an illegal murder shall be punished by the court 
of state X.
a. Perpetrator A committed a murder.
b. Perpetrator A is liable to a punishment imposed by the court of 
state X.
In this view, the only uncertain element is the applied method of deter-
mining illegality (sanctioned norm). Theoretically, there is no reason 
penalisation (sanctioning norm) would not cover, for instance, an illegal 
disclosure of a foreign state’s secret, even though the very issue of regu-
lating the way in which such a secret is handled lies within the exclusive 
competence of the foreign state. In this regard, the state might protect 
virtually any norm of conduct indirectly provided that the introduction 
of protective instruments does not infringe international law.
The above described mixed character of criminal law (regulatory 
and penal) is reflected in the structure of conjugated norms. In the back-
ground part it was mentioned that penal norms are built from normative 
elements (e.g. provisions of law) derived from different sources (bills, 
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codes, etc.). Some of them have a more regulatory character, others more 
penal. We can divide them into three groups:
a. directives (element of a sanctioned norm) – e.g. you shall drive to 
the right;
b. prohibition/order (element of a sanctioned norm) – e.g. you shall 
not cause the death;
c. elements of sanctioning norm – you shall impose the punishment 
on an individual who causes death illegally.
The first of the above category has the most regulatory character. It can 
work without penalization. The last one is the penal per se. The prohibi-
tion/order lay somewhere between regulation and penalization. Further 
considerations are focused on presenting a model of limiting the validity 
of each of these elements, taking into account factors of limitation of state 
power, all described in the background section.
2. Legislative jurisdiction in the context of criminal law
As it was said above, the directives (elements of a sanctioned norm) have 
a purely regulatory character. They are derived from different branches 
of law and indicate how to behave in a particular social situation (how to 
drive a car, which kind of taxes we should pay, under what circumstances 
you can do anything, etc.). The question is how to indicate binding direc-
tives when such a situation has an international or cross-border character. 
In this aim it is necessary to establish the spatial scope of validity of the 
directives, taking into account the national laws, the limits of legislative 
jurisdiction and the rule of reason, which allows elimination of concur-
rent competencies, the setting of which seems necessary in the process 
of decoding a norm.
The state has the power to limit the validity of its law in space – this 
solution is widely enforced in domestic legal systems138. It is possible to 
indicate four main methods of limitation. Firstly, national law can intro-
duce a special regulation that limits the validity of norms interpreted with 
account to provisions of a given normative act (e.g., an act that regulates 
138 This solution is present especially in common law systems, where presumption against 
extraterritoriality is in force – see: Doyle, supra note 2, at 5; Knox, A Presumption, supra 
note 11.
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the drug trade is binding solely within the territory of a given state). 
Secondly, this limitation may arise from the provision itself, as it consti-
tutes the grounds for decoding a sanctioned norm in terms of a directive 
of conduct (e.g., in the case of provisions that refer to crossing of state 
X’s borders). Thirdly, the limits of the “competence to set standards” may 
also shape limited competencies of a body whose decision determines 
the validity of a norm (e.g., marketing authorisation of pharmaceuticals). 
Fourthly, there might occur a precise conflict of law rule that excludes 
the validity of a directive in the case that it becomes concurrent with 
another directive of conduct.
The highest number of interpretative issues occurs in the cases where 
neither precise conflict of law rules nor domestic limitations appear. In 
such cases, the only tool for limiting the scope of the competence to set 
standards is an indefinite rule of reason.
Let’s imagine a  situation, when one man, the citizen of state Y, 
starts to produce some medicines in his or her factory which is placed 
in state X. These medicines are dedicated only for the internal market 
of state Y. State Y provides the law that everyone who is producing any 
drugs for the internal market of Y is obliged to act under the quality 
standards established by Y. On the other hand, state X provides its own 
quality standards, completely inconsistent with the law of Y. The question 
is: which state has the power to regulate this aspect of social life? To give 
an answer, it is necessary to categorize the types of possible situations of 
norm’s concurrence.
Here, one ought to distinguish three main categories of concurrence: 
1) apparent concurrence, i.e., a situation where one state’s competence 
falls into the category of exclusive competence, 2) a concurrence of two 
equal competencies whereby norms are not in conflict, and 3) a situa-
tion of concurrent competencies to set standards combined with the 
occurrence of contradictory norms. Each of these categories is analysed 
further below regarding the rule of reason, which constitutes the criteria 
that determines the limits of legislative jurisdiction.
In this context, the least doubt arises in relation to circumstances 
where several states claim the right to set standards in a given situa-
tion, where one of them has exclusive competence in this regard. In this 
case, powers of other states are apparent. As noted above, powers related 
to the exclusive area in the strict sense effectively limit other entities’ 
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powers. The scope of powers instituting the exclusive area must be de-
termined individually for each state. In this respect, a clear distinction 
should be made between the power to set standards understood as cre-
ating binding directives of conduct addressed to an individual, and the 
right to inflict punishment for infringing the said regulations. The scope 
of these powers is not concurrent – thus, it might be that the court of the 
forum state imposes a penalty for infringement of the norms of a foreign 
state.
However, the scope of legislative competencies is very different in 
a situation where no entity has the exclusive right to regulate a specific 
matter, though at the same time, there is no contradiction regarding the 
wording of norms. Two categories of situations can be specified here. 
Firstly, the cumulative power to set standards occurs in the case of norms 
that protect universal interests that satisfy the requirements specified 
above (e.g., prohibition of slavery). Here, no issue of discrepancy in terms 
of the content occurs since they are determined by a consensus success-
fully set on the international level. In the case of concurrent norms, they 
can be freely granted the value of validity at the very same time. Thus, 
neither does the sovereignty of a foreign state become violated nor do 
norms of international law become infringed. Theoretically, one could 
pursue to determine a state which has exclusive powers, though it would 
be pointless with regard to the concurrence of norms in terms of their 
contents. Secondly, the similar would apply to a situation where one of 
the norms imposes higher standards of conduct when the state that has 
set them has a stronger right to set standards. An executed disposition 
of a norm of state X would remedy a disposition of state Y.
The last case of concurrent legislative jurisdictions is a  situation 
where entities who have the power to set standards lay down contradic-
tory regulations, whereby an executed disposition of a norm of state X 
infringes on a norm of state Y and vice versa. Here, the concurrence of 
competencies is combined with a conflict of norms that must be resolved 
by limiting the validity of one of these norms. Only in this way can an 
individual who undertakes a given conduct have the chance to behave 
in accordance with the law. The analysed conflict ought to be resolved by 
recourse to weighing nexuses, assuming that the value of validity pertains 
to the norm that was laid down by the state with a stronger legitimacy 
under the rule of reason.
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However, it ought to be noted that in a situation where the subject 
of protection is a universal value while the standard of protection intro-
duced prima facie by a foreign norm is unacceptably low, one possibility 
is that this norm is not binding due to its wording and not – as in the 
case of weighing nexuses – due to the stronger power of the forum state. 
The question of the criteria that determines the limits of non-acceptance 
remains open. This issue cannot be solved based on this paper alone since 
the standard itself is not as much already developed as under develop-
ment by the practice of states139; among extremely unjust norms one must 
list, i.e., those permitting commitment of international crimes classified 
as the so-called core crimes140. This notion is subjected to analysis further 
in the paper.
It is important to underline that the spatial scope of the competence 
to set standards for directives should be determined individually for each 
standard-setting expression. This entails significant consequences. In 
the case of making a criminal law assessment of behaviours executed 
abroad, it might be obligatory to construct norms of national law based 
on standard-setting expressions derived from  various legal systems. 
In this approach, potentially “concurrent” standard-setting expressions 
are eliminated primarily by excluding the competence of state Y to set 
up the provision PY1 and simultaneously recognising the competence 
of the state X to set up the provision PX1. The said provision becomes 
a constituent of the norm N interpreted by the court of state Y. Thus, as 
a result, a sanctions norm that can be described by the following equa-
tion is interpreted: N = Z – (PX1 + PY2 + PY3). Individual standard-setting 
expressions derived from various legal systems are hence combined into 
a single norm due to an interpretation by the court of the forum state 
139 Hathaway, supra note 10, at 148; Donnelly, supra note 83, at 151–152; Marcelo 
D. Varella, Internationalization of Law. Globalization, International Law and Complexity 
221–247 (Springer 2014).
140 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 116; Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice. The 
Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 1919-1950 284–285 (Oxford University 
Press 2014); Cynthia Sinatra, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
and the Application of Genocide, 5 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 417–418 (2005); Cherif M. Bassiouni, 
Crimes Against Humanity. Historical evolution and contemporary application 263–269 
(Cambridge University Press 2011), especially, when he cites M. Whiteman: “obligations 
owed to the international community as a whole, stating that such obligations derive, for 
example, in contemporary international law from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and 
of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human 
person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination”.
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or by an entity who is the addressee of the norm. In the norm-decoding 
process, one ought to take into consideration only these directives, which 
are characterised by the competence to set standards.
3. Ius puniendi in the international context
In the background section, the ius puniendi was defined as the compe-
tence of the state to perform the four functions of criminal law: protective, 
justice, guarantee and restorative. All of them are strongly connected with 
the idea of criminal law as domaine reserve. This approach is no longer 
appropriate when these functions are considered in the international 
framework.
In a “domestic” situation, without international context, the protec-
tive function is fulfilled by the implementation of penal provisions, which 
are coherent with other elements of domestic legal system (e.g., admin-
istrative law). Penal norms support the others by providing sanctions 
for breaching the law. In the international context, the situation gets 
complicated when penal norms set up by the forum state not only entail 
a sanction for infringement of law but also create a certain autonomous 
directive of conduct addressed to the individual141. After all, general pre-
vention, both in its negative and positive aspect, is focused on forming 
attitudes of society as a collective142. Just for example, one state establishes 
the provision: “Whoever, who terminates the pregnancy of women is 
subject to the penalty of imprisonment for up to 3 years”. It is quite clear 
that such a norm has not only penal but also regulatory character. It 
prohibits abortion and not only imposes the punishment. This, in turn, 
may obviously result in an infringement of the foreign state’s sovereignty. 
Because of that fact, the scope of competence to execute the ius puniendi 
in the aspect of protective function shall be considered in a context of the 
scope of legislative jurisdiction. This issue is subject to analysis further 
in the article.
The need for rightful retribution (justice function) for the performed 
acts now is not limited to the place of the act located outside the borders 
141 “Regulative rule such as ‘Thou shall not kill’ are constraining in that they order us to 
adopt a certain behaviour” – Kratochwil, supra note 3, at 26.
142 Jodłowski, supra note 68, at 255; Bayles, supra note 67, at 281–282.
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of a given state. Due to an increasingly closer international collaboration 
on the individual level, boundaries between individual societies under-
stood as communities with shared interests become blurred. The German 
or Polish society would demand that the perpetrators of the attacks in 
Paris be punished just as the French society would. The mass media 
development and the progressing globalisation processes resulted in the 
fact that many behaviours that have recently had a local nature, today 
affect societies of foreign states with all intensity. One can readily im-
agine a situation where a murderer acts within the territory of one state, 
brutally murdering only incoming journalists, filming acts of violence 
and publishing them on the Internet. It seems unlikely that in such a case 
societies of foreign states are less moved by the perpetrator’s act than the 
population of the state where the acts take place, especially in the era of 
mass media development, when as a matter of fact, information about 
a murder can raise concerns across the entire globe143.
Striving to exercise the justice function may be characterised by var-
ying intensity depending on the nature of the attack, the type of legal 
rights or, lastly, the carrier’s characteristics. By exercising ius puniendi 
with the intent to satisfy the society’s need for punishing, the forum state 
may remain in conflict with powers of foreign states on two levels. Firstly, 
it might result in compromised interests of a foreign state by imposing 
a certain standard of handling legal rights. Secondly, considering the 
increasingly broader application of the ne bis in idem principle in interna-
tional law144, the result might be that the possibility to exercise the justice 
143 This may be illustrated by materials distributed by the Islamic State, which constitute 
the records of the execution. What is interesting, theoretically, is that the above argu-
ment can be reversed. The lack of criminal liability limits may entail the extension of 
the positive liability boundaries. This, in turn, can significantly affect, for example, crim-
inal liability on the ground of Article 162. § 1 of Polish Penal Code, which stipulates: 
“Whoever does not provide assistance to a person being in an immediate danger of 
loss of life or sustaining a grievous bodily harm, even though he could have provided it, 
is without exposing himself or another person to a danger of loss of life or sustaining 
a grievous bodily harm, is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to one 
year” – translation: W. Wróbel, A. Wojtaszczyk, W. Zontek, Kodeks karny. Przepisy 
dwujęzyczne. Criminal Code, Warszawa 2014, p. 153. By means of the mass media, 
it is possible to provide reliable information about a dying person who can be rescued 
by paying money to, say, the Red Cross – a failure to pay could mean the execution of 
a crime. See: P. Hulsroj, The Principle of Proportionality…, p. 39.
144 Gerard Convay, Ne Bis in Idem in International Law, 3 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 217–244 (2003); 
Sakowicz, supra note 83, at 89–133.
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function by the entity with a stronger right to punish becomes excluded. 
In both cases, the interest which is in a conflict with the need to satisfy 
the sense of justice is the sovereignty of the foreign state. Importantly, 
any potential disputes arising with regard to this matter are related to 
the applicability of norms of substantive law under a specific case – of-
tentimes these can be resolved on the procedural level.
Considering the guarantee function and the nullum crimen principle 
in the light of conditions for liability for crimes committed abroad, one 
ought to note two essential matters. Firstly, contrary to the protective 
function and the justice function, where on the level of setting up norms 
of substantive law, the reference point was the interest of a certain col-
lective striving to protect a specific value system or to satisfy their own 
sense of justice, in the case of the guarantee function, the central element 
is the interest of the perpetrator, in respect of whom the state exercises 
a sovereign competence. In this case, a significant factor that limits the 
right to punish is the need to respect human rights and not – as in the 
case of the protective function or the justice function – the sovereignty 
of the foreign state. Secondly, considering the above, one ought to note 
that the norm of conduct that the perpetrator is bound to in a given 
situation should be determined from his or her point of view. The above 
issue is significant insofar that the nature of the penal norm repressions, 
which serve as the grounds for the imposition of a penalty, is not the same 
that could potentially affect the perpetrator at the moment of the act. 
However, these must be characterised by the same content145. To a cer-
tain extent, the right to punish cannot be exercised by the forum state 
due to the need to exercise the nullum crimen standard. The guarantee 
function excludes the possibility of executing the remaining objectives 
of criminal law. In view of the power to set up norms of substantive law 
that are subject to a prohibition, this presupposes primarily a need to in-
terpret the contents of norms in a way that narrows them down to limits 
determined by the nullum crimen standard. This is examined in a broader 
perspective further in the article.
Providing the victim with a significant role in the process of exe-
cuting the right to punish also affects the conditions for the liability for 
145 What is important is the content of the norm, and not its source, see: Franciszek 
Studnicki, Znajomość i nieznajomość prawa [Knowledge and Ignorance of the Law], 
206 Państwo i Prawo 578 (1962).
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crimes committed abroad since, in the view of the forum state, the power 
to exercise ius puniendi grows stronger as long as the victim of the crime 
is a person who remains related to the said state146. Furthermore, it seems 
that the victim’s stay within the territory of the forum state may constitute 
a certain condition for holding the perpetrator liable even in a situation 
where there is no specific personal proximity between the forum state 
and the victim. Though the victim’s stay within the territory of the state 
does not constitute a jurisdictive nexus in its own right, it might be an 
argument supportive of the state’s claim to punish the perpetrator. It 
could find application particularly in cases where ius puniendi is exer-
cised under the principle of substitutive criminalisation147.
Considering the ius puniendi as a right to impose punishment for 
acts committed abroad, it is necessary to take into account the above 
context. All the functions of criminal law seem to have features, which 
are not very important in “domestic” cases but shall be taken into account 
while deriving penal norms in international situations. As it was said, 
executing ius puniendi can disturb not only the sovereignty of another 
state but also values protected under human rights. The next part of this 
work contains the analysis of the possible ways of these violations. All of 
them are illegal from the perspective of international law. By establishing 
the boundaries of illegality, it will be possible to describe the scope of 
legal extent of ius puniendi.
3.1. Sovereignty of foreign states as a limiting factor of ius puniendi
Conflict of sovereignties in a context of executing ius puniendi may 
manifest itself in two ways. The first one pertains to concurrent scopes 
of ius puniendi of two eligible states, both of which strive for executing 
the criminal law function. Alternatively, the ius puniendi of the forum 
state may remain in conflict with another competence of a foreign state, 
particularly the right to protect one’s own culture and to establish law 
in line with the underlying value system. In both cases, the condition 
146 Geoffrey R.  Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-based Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 17 Yale J. Int’l L. 61 (1992); Regula Echle, The Passive Personality Principle 
and the General Principle of Ne Bis In Idem, 9 Utrecht L. Rev. 56–57 (2013).
147 Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 103; Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction. Council of Europe, 
European Committee on Crime Problems, 3 Criminal Law Forum 452 (1992).
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for applying ius puniendi by the forum state is to prove that the value 
of thus fulfilled interests outweighs the value of the sacrificed interests.
Wherever the value systems underlying penal norms are concurrent, 
the potential violation of sovereignty consists in punishing the perpetra-
tor in a way that allows ius puniendi to be exercised by a different eligi-
ble state (due to the place of the act, the perpetrator’s citizenship, etc.). 
Ius puniendi is traditionally considered by international law an exclusive 
power of the state148. However, this exclusivity amounts to a statement 
that no other state can either prohibit or impose a penalty for a given act 
on behalf of the eligible state in a way that results in an exclusion of its 
right to punish149. Nevertheless, considering the increasing respect for the 
principle ne bis in idem in international law150, the matter of determin-
ing the precedence in exercising ius puniendi becomes of vital importance. 
The mentioned limits do not have a substantive character, though, while 
the dispute takes place on the level of law application and is related to 
procedural obstacles151. Considering the above, the issue outlined in this 
paper remains beyond the scope of a broader analysis provided herein.
The matter of the limits of ius puniendi is very different in a situa-
tion where the power of the forum state remains in conflict with another 
power that can be defined as the right to shape the domestic law152. As 
a political organism, the state has the right to determine social relations 
within its borders in a way that ensures the broadest possible execution of 
the culture standard relevant for the society that makes up its population. 
Each state has the right to protect the values it views as deserving to be 
protected with due respect for the sovereignty of third states and human 
rights. In practice, it might be thought that some behaviours regarded 
as negative and deserving of penalisation from the view of the forum 
state remain within the scope of social acceptance if assessed taking into 
account the cultural context binding in the place of the act. In this case, 
a potential infringement of sovereignty may consist in forming a condi-
tion where the individual has to take into consideration norms of foreign 
148 Sakowicz, supra note 83, at 161; Hallevy, supra note 18, at 86.
149 The dysfunctionality of such an approach in the era of European solidarity is highlighted 
by A. Sakowicz – Sakowicz, supra note 83, at 161.
150 Sakowicz, supra note 83, at 95–96.
151 On possible methods of resolving conflicts of jurisdiction – Sakowicz, supra note 83, 
at 436–462.
152 Jackson, supra note 10, at 123.
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law in his or her actions. Thus, the forum state affects the social organisa-
tion, circumventing the limits set by the scope of legislative jurisdiction. 
Moreover, one ought to take into account that individually protected legal 
rights do not function separately but affect one another. An introduction 
of an additional norm of conduct into the domestic law system – as one 
ought to consider the execution of the assumptions laid in the general 
prevention – may result in a disturbance of the existing balance. This 
condition should be taken into consideration in the process of setting 
up the limits of ius puniendi. In the case of crimes committed abroad, 
the execution of the general prevention objectives is thus possible only to 
the extent the content of penal norms coincides with the content of norms 
of conduct of a state that has the competence to set standards in a specific 
social situation (alternatively, with norms derived from international law).
Considering the above, one should specify the category of conditions 
that ought to be taken into account in the assessment of the forum state’s 
power to lay down an abstract criminal law norm in a given case. In the 
view of international law, it would be necessary to weigh the interests of 
individual entities. To this end, it is vital to define the values covered in 
the dispute, which should be specified in the greatest possible detail. It 
does not suffice to make a general statement that boils down to playing 
off powers to set up internal affairs and rights that comprise ius puniendi 
against each other. Moreover, it seems necessary to situate these values 
in a cultural context. Only then would it be possible to determine their 
significance. In practice, this serves as the source of significant compli-
cations related on the one hand with the way in which these rights are 
defined and, on the other, with the way they are weighed. Hypothetically, 
clear situations can also occur – such an unauthorised interference takes 
place in a situation where the sanctioned norm of conduct requires the 
addressee to violate another state’s interests. In most cases, assessment 
gives rise to serious problems.
Let us use an example153. State X introduced a commonly binding 
norm that imposes penalties for verbally abusing its citizens regardless 
153 The example above is a modification of the real case of A.K. Cutting, who was in-
sulting a Mexican citizen within the territory of the US. See: Geoffrey R. Watson, The 
Passive Personality Principle, 28 Tex. Int’l L.J. 5–6 (1993); Ryngaert, supra note 7, at 62; 
John B. Moore, Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case, United States 
Department of State 130 (1887).
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of the place of the act and dual criminality. The prima facie norm is 
binding also in the territory of state Y whose citizens give much value 
to free speech and do not penalize verbal abuse. To verify if validity of 
the norm alone constitutes an infringement of state Y’s sovereignty, one 
should specify the way in which the validity of an abstract penal norm 
prohibiting verbal abuse of X citizens affects the limitation of the value of 
free speech in the state of Y, thus specifying its place in the hierarchy of 
legal rights. On the other hand, it would be vital to specify the extent to 
which invalidity of the said norm leads to a lowered standard of protec-
tion of the legal right in the form of honour of a citizen of state X during 
his or her stay in state Y, simultaneously specifying the place of this legal 
right in the place of this legal right in the hierarchy of values of X citizens.
The subsequent step is to compare these two values with account to 
a condition that the event discussed took place in the territory of state Y 
and the perpetrator was a citizen of that state (nature of a nexus), where-
as the sole element that related the crime with state X was the victim’s 
identity. The situation is further complicated by the fact that, in practice, 
the above assessment must be made by a body of the forum state at the 
stage of creating or applying the law. Therefore, there is a  risk that it 
would be an expression of the state’s interests and not a result of weighed 
objective arguments. If, according to the result of the thus-performed 
evaluation in a specific case, the execution of the right to punish in the 
substantive aspect leads to an excessive limitation of the foreign state’s 
sovereignty, the norm of substantive law laid down by the forum state 
must be deemed not in force. The criminal law of the forum state cannot 
serve as a  tool for imposing specific cultural standards. Thus, in this 
situation it is not as much a clash of individual competencies that takes 
place but of the axiological systems they secure. Both the forum state 
and other countries entitled to regulate conduct or solely to punish the 
perpetrator result in taking under their protection a system of values 
that best reflects the axiology of the society in the name of which the 
administration of justice is exercised. The greater cultural differences 
between the competing entities, the greater the probability of conflict, 
while the lesser cultural diversity, the lesser the possibility of infringing 
the foreign state’s sovereignty.
In practice, situations where the forum state can introduce an effec-
tive extra-territorial prohibiting norm subject to sanction without the 
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need to take into account other entities’ sovereignty are also possible. 
What is more, situations where the introduction can be performed by the 
forum state can also occur. This is possible in two cases. The first is when 
a given social situation is not subject to any state authority. Such events 
are rare, since even in cases where the perpetrator commits murder with-
in the territory that is not subject to any authority his or her conduct can 
be regulated based on a personal jurisdictional nexus. Secondly, in cases 
where the eligible state sets up norms of conduct with regard to a given 
legal right that infringes the standard of human rights protection. In this 
regard, the way of exercising sovereignty is not protected by international 
law – a norm set up by the forum state, which is in conflict with the legal 
order of the state where the act was committed is not illegally compro-
mising its sovereignty. This issue is discussed further in the paper.
3.2. Human rights as a limiting factor of ius puniendi
The impact exerted on the national ius puniendi by norms of inter-
national law that constitute the system of human rights protection ought 
to be examined on two levels: a state–state level and a state–individual 
level. Here, it seems vital to take into account interests of at least three 
entities: 1) the forum state, whose interest is to execute criminal law 
objectives; 2) the foreign state, whose power is to set up standards of 
social relations and to execute ius puniendi; 3) the perpetrator, who has 
the right to know the wording of the law to which he or she is bound to 
and the right to behave in line with the standard relevant to the society 
of which he or she is a member.
When examining the impact of human rights on the shaping of limits 
of ius puniendi in the state-state perspective, one ought to stress that the 
issue here is not the conflict between sovereignty and fundamental values 
derived from human dignity. If there is a clash of competencies of two 
states representing concurrent cultural standards that do not compro-
mise human rights, such a conflict does not take place, for in this case, the 
conflicting values are two sovereignties, whereas the dispute itself boils 
down to weighing the significance of nexuses. Thus, the arguments pre-
sented below refer only to cases where the secured standards of human 
rights protection are divergent. The scope of powers of the forum state 
depends on the nature of this conflict.
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First of all, in a situation where human rights are significantly in-
fringed within the territory of a given state, such as in the case of in-
ternational crimes, all the states have the right to punish individuals 
guilty of this sort of act under the principle of universal jurisdiction154. 
Furthermore, each state that does not exercise its competence is obliged 
to surrender the perpetrator to the entities interested in prosecution 
under the principle of aut dedere aut iudicare, which is binding in this 
regard155. In the case discussed, virtually all states enjoy broad powers, 
including procedural rights. As shown in the Adolf Eichmann case, when 
international crimes come into play, the accepted interference with a for-
eign state’s sovereignty includes even an abduction of the perpetrator 
with the intent to bring him to justice156.
However, it might be that the perpetrator’s behaviour, though an in-
fringement to the fundamental values provided for under human rights, 
does not constitute an international crime and is simultaneously regard-
ed as licit upon the law of the place of the act. It was noted above that 
each state can freely shape the legal system as far as to the limits set by 
human rights and the sovereignty of other states. However, a question 
arises as to what extent the state is obliged to ensure a proper standard 
of security for rights derived from human dignity and to what extent 
foreign states are eligible to punish the conduct of a given individual 
that compromises thus defined rights. To provide an example of the 
154 Iwanek, supra note 84, at 128. In the last two decades there have indeed been two cas-
es of prosecution of international crimes in absentia – see: Ved P. Nanda, Christopher 
K. Hall, Wolfgang Kaleck, Diane Orentlicher, Universal Jurisdiction. It’s back!, 102 Am. 
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. Iii 397–404 (2008); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect and the 
Spanish Contribution to Universal Jurisdiction, in: International Prosecution of Human 
Rights Crimes 113–124 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al. eds., Springer 2007).
155 Meron, supra note 83, at 209. It should be indicated in the doctrine that there is a con-
troversy over the scope of the commitment, and some researchers point out that in 
this case it comes to the entitlement, not the obligation to prosecute – see: Iwanek, 
supra note 84, at 111. In view of the judgment in Belgium v. Senegal, I.C.J. Reports, 
Advisory Opinions and Orders Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute 
or Extradite, Judgment of 20 July 2012, such a position appears to be out of date 
in the case of states which are parties to relevant international conventions (see 
e.g.: UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1465, Art. 27).
156 Sidney Liskofsky, The Eichmann Case, 62 American Jewish Year Book 199–208 (1961); 
Kau C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 810–815 
(March 1988).
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above, one ought to ask what is the extent of state X’s right to punish 
a perpetrator who is a citizen of state Y and who committed a common 
murder within the borders of state Y, given that, in the light of the norms 
the perpetrator is bound to due to the presence of classic jurisdictive 
nexuses, the said murder did not constitute a crime.
In the above example, in view of a state with the standard-setting 
powers, it is not only the protection of the exclusive right to punish that 
is at stake but the protection of a certain pathological (in the view of 
human rights standard) cultural standard. Values involved in human 
rights protection remain in conflict not solely with sovereignty but with 
other underlying values of the system. The conflict takes place when 
the law, which the perpetrator is prima facie bound to, allows values 
covered by the protection of universal human rights157 to be infringed to 
the extent that a permit itself constitutes an infringement of these rights. 
This would apply to norms excluding penalisation for an honour killing 
yet, as it seems – also in numerous other less drastic situations. In the 
view of human rights, the main objection pertains to shaping the legal 
system in a way that does not ensure proper protection of an individual’s 
fundamental rights, resulting in an infringement of international law. 
The state cannot execute its competencies arising under its sovereignty 
in the above manner, whereas legal protection of thus defined stand-
ard constitutes in itself an infringement of human rights. In this case, 
the  forum state is no longer limited in the execution of ius puniendi 
by the third state’s sovereignty and can hence make use of the right to 
punish to an extent required by human rights protection. Therefore, in 
the view of sovereignty, it is permitted to punish the perpetrator both for 
an act considered lawful under domestic law and for an act that faced 
an inadequate response, which is, actually, an expression of consent to 
penal acts (e.g., imposing a  fine as a  penalty for murder). Here, one 
ought to stress that it is not the perpetrator’s act that is being assessed 
but the normative context in which the act was committed. In this view, 
the entire interpretive effort taken to provide an assessment whether in 
a given situation exercising the right to punish entails an infringement 
of a  foreign state’s sovereignty ought to focus on proving that, in the 
reality of a given case, the domestic law was shaped by the said state 
157 Iwanek, supra note 84, at 91; Czepek, supra note 86, at 23, 172–173.
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in a way that triggered an infringement of binding responsibilities that 
comprise human rights158.
Apart from the legitimising function, human rights also have a limit-
ing role with regard to the right to punish. Considering that the address-
ees of human rights are mainly states159, one ought to assume that it is the 
aspect of human rights that has the most significant implications on ius 
puniendi. The forum state, which exercises its powers under ius puniendi, 
extends its authority over the perpetrator. At the same time, the said per-
petrator operates within set cultural standards defined primarily by the 
law of the place of the act. Some rules of conduct he or she acts in line 
with have a legal nature, while others are derived from life experiences 
or commonly accepted moral indications. When undertaking his or her 
conduct, the perpetrator ought to have the capacity to tell what is legal 
and what is prohibited on pain of penalty160. Moreover, the perpetrator 
has the right to behave in line with his or her own value system161. In 
this regard, one can note two values protected under the human rights 
protection system. Firstly, every person has the right to behave in line 
with the value system of his or her own culture: human rights ensure 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to raise children 
according to their own beliefs. Secondly, a person who performs a given 
behaviour has the right to know which behaviour is prohibited on pain of 
penalty. Here, protection consists in taking the nullum crimen162 standard 
into consideration. Both of these values affect the scope of ius puniendi.
With regard to the first of the issues described above, one ought 
to note that the matter of conduct in a different cultural reality can be 
reduced to two problems.
158 As stated above, the scope of these obligations will depend on the content of interna-
tional norms binding on the state.
159 “International documents clearly recognize the states as first violators of human rights 
and they indicate that the primary responsibility for protecting human rights will also 
belong to states. With respect to ensure this obligation of states operating as a protector 
and violator in the same way, the system has been internationalized” – Zohadi, supra 
note 87, at 100. Czepek, supra note 86, at 15.
160 Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A Theory on the Principle 
of Legality in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 862 
(2008–2009).
161 Czepek, supra note 86, at 208–213.
162 Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law 
and Morals, 97 Geo. L.J. 172–188 (2008); Dana, supra note 160, at 867.
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It might be the case that an individual’s behaviour, though meet-
ing the criteria of a crime in the view of the forum state, is allowed by 
compulsory norms at the moment of the implementation of the action, 
whereas the wording of the said norms does not infringe the human 
rights protection standard. For instance, state X grants permission for 
risky financial transactions as a result of which a business could incur 
losses, while state Y penalises this type of conduct. In this case, the fo-
rum state has no right to establish a prohibitive binding norm subject to 
a sanction that affects the shape of the domestic organisation of state X 
to a broader extent than under state Y’s legislative jurisdiction. Moreover, 
the right to live in line with a culturally determined and internalised 
value system is a value protected under international law. The forum 
state is obliged to respect this liberty. Consequently, even in a situation 
where an individual familiarises himself with the law of the forum state, 
he or she will not be obliged to obey the prohibitions or orders subject 
to sanctions covered by the said law.
The situation is different when the perpetrator’s behaviour consti-
tutes an infringement of human rights in itself which, considering that 
no standard pertaining to the protection of such rights is prima facie 
taken into account, does not constitute a crime in the light of norms 
the perpetrator is bound to at the moment of the act. Here, two types of 
situation can be distinguished.
On the one hand, it might be that, as a result of no implementation 
of rules that secure human rights in the national law, the individual in-
ternalises the standard that infringes values included in the human rights 
protection. In this case, though it cannot by any means determine the lack 
of liability in abstracto, one ought to note that the main burden of guilt 
for this state of affairs is on the state that introduced the unacceptable 
legislation. Though the above condition does not result in an exclusion of 
the forum state’s powers to establish abstract norms that would prohibit 
such infringement, it should be taken into account in the criminal law 
assessment of the act, at the stage of imposing the penalty or by means 
of allowing for an excusable error of the law as a circumstance excluding 
criminal liability163. In fact, we are dealing here with a lack of awareness 
of the validity of a norm that prohibits a given behaviour. In this case, 
163 Grabowski, supra note 93, at 555–558.
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the forum state that defends human rights has the right to introduce 
a general prohibitive norm subject to sanction, the application of which 
can be subsequently limited using legal constructs as early as at the stage 
of attributing agency or the measure of penalty.
On the other hand, it might be that the perpetrator, aware of the 
pathological content of norms valid in a given area, uses them in a some-
what instrumental way to do wrong. Here, there is no conflict between 
the value of the right to behave in line with the internalised axiological 
system derived from culture, but with human rights. There cannot be 
any internalisation and, hence, it is impossible to refer to an error in 
the law. The fact of being within the borders of a foreign state does not 
justify the wrong committed by the perpetrator who takes his unfaithful 
wife on a trip abroad only to take her life there with the full consent of 
the binding law.
In the light of the above, in the case that an act that infringes human 
rights is committed abroad, on the level of the conflict between the right 
to act in line with the value system and values derived directly from 
human dignity, the former has to give way to the latter.
Exercising powers that comprise ius puniendi may also remain in 
conflict with the value of legal certainty and the described nullum crimen 
sine lege principle. According to the said principle, no one should be 
subject to punishment for an act that did not constitute a crime at the 
time it was carried out164. In this respect, a conflict between individual 
objectives of criminal law becomes more prominent. A fully exercised 
justice function or protective and compensatory function might hamper 
exercising the guarantee function described in the light of the nullum cri-
men standard. It imposes on the state an obligation to inform individuals 
of types of behaviour considered punishable165, thus limiting lawbreak-
ing (lawmaking). In the case that no proper information is issued, the 
court has to decide not to apply a norm that violates the nullum crimen 
164 Claus Kreß, Nulla poena nullum crimen sine lege, in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (2010) http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/978 
0199231690/law-9780199231690-e854?rskey=tG32hx&result=1&prd=EPIL; Dana, 
supra note 160, at 862; Guido Acquaviv, Revisiting Classics. At the Origins of Crimes 
Against Humanity: Clues to a Proper Understanding of the Nullum Crimen Principle in 
the Nuremberg Judgment, 9 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 883–884 (2011).
165 Dana, supra note 160, at 862.
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principle (application aspect166). This is traditionally linked primarily 
to the temporal aspect of the validity of a legal act167; however, if trans-
lated into the context of liability for acts committed abroad, a question 
arises whether it should also be considered with regard to the territorial 
aspect168. From the perspective of an individual, there is no significant 
difference whether the norms that are applied to him or her have been 
introduced into the legal system following the occurrence of the act or 
have been expressed as part of a legal system that is completely unknown, 
which he or she had had no obligation or opportunity to familiarise 
herself or himself with. 
Considering the above, a question arises as to the extent to which 
a given state’s power to set up penal norms is limited by a requirement 
to observe the nullum crimen standard. In order to answer this ques-
tion, it seems vital to seek norms of international law that refer to the 
said principle. Though the nullum crimen principle is customary169, it 
has been specified in detail in the convention law. A thus established 
standard is binding in the Republic of Poland and other states that are 
bound to the letter of treaties170. The limits of ius puniendi are provid-
ed for, i.e., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights171, the ICCPR172, 
166 Alchourrón & Bulygin, supra note 96, at 141.
167 Kreß, supra note 164; Dana, supra note 160, at 866; Fabien Raimondo, General Principles 
of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals 108 (Brill-Nijhof 
2008); Acquaviv, supra note 164, at 883; Shahabuddeen, supra note 80, at 1008.
168 Dana, supra note 160, at 870.
169 Dana, supra note 160, at 871; Kreß, supra note 164.
170 Kreß, supra note 164.
171 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 
217 A (III), the Article 11: “1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to 
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he 
has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. 2. No one shall be held guilty of 
any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal 
offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor 
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the 
penal offence was committed.”
172 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, the Art. 15: “1. No one shall be held guilty 
of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute 
a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was commit-
ted. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the 
time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the 
offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender 
shall benefit thereby. 2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment 
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the ECHR173 and the CFR174. Each of the listed legal acts limits the scope 
of the right to punish for an act that constitutes a crime under the law 
the perpetrator is bound to at the moment of performing the said act 
(“domestic law” under the ICCPR and the ECHR, and “national law” 
under the Universal Declaration and the CFR, respectively). The content 
of the commitments ought to be analysed with regard to two objectives. 
Firstly, it should be determined whether by referring to a specific nature 
of the act it is examined solely in the temporal aspect or they refer to the 
validity of the law in space. Secondly, to the extent to which they allow 
penalisation of acts not provided for in domestic law, sources of inter-
national laws that serve as the basis for exercising ius puniendi ought to 
be determined.
One ought to begin his or her considerations from the first of the 
depicted issues. Here, the essence of the dispute comes down to the 
meaning of the phrases “domestic law” and “national law”, which ought 
to be considered one and the same. In legal science, the emphasis is put 
of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was 
criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of 
nations.” 
173 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, 
ETS 5, the Art. 7: “1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account 
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or 
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be 
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was com-
mitted. 2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any 
act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to 
the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.” It should be emphasized 
that the nullum crimen principle is a rule that cannot be limited or excluded even during 
armed conflicts. See: Jakub Kociubiński, Zasada “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege” 
i jej ograniczenia w orzecznictwie ETPC [The Principle of “nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena 
Sine Lege” and Its Limitations in ECTHR Jurisprudence], 28 Nowa Kodyfikacja Prawa 
Karnego 269–283 (2012); Liżewski, supra note 83, at 287; Kreß, supra note 164.
174 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 
2012, 2012/C 326/02, the Art. 49: “1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence 
on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under 
national law or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence 
was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of a criminal offence, the law provides 
for a lighter penalty, that penalty shall be applicable. 2. This Article shall not prejudice 
the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when 
it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles recognised by the 
community of nations.”
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primarily on the temporal aspect of a principle175. However, according 
to Piotr Hofmański, when it comes to the place of the act, Article 7 must 
be interpreted in a way that allows “domestic law” to be understood 
as “the law of the location of the perpetrator’s act”. Such an intuition 
seems valid – the meaning of the nullum crimen principle is to protect 
the perpetrator against punishment for behaviour that was not known 
to the perpetrator as punishable despite exercising due diligence176. The 
above statement deserves partial approval and still calls for a more am-
plified approach, as it pertains, not solely to the law of the place of the 
act, but also to the legislation of states that have a standard-setting power 
due to the presence of legally relevant nexuses. One can still distinguish 
two groups of entities: those who have the competence to establish norms 
of conduct and those who do not have such competence. Norms set up 
by entities classified with the first group constitute the “domestic law” or 
the “national law” under the above-listed acts of international law. These 
are the sole acts that can regulate an individual’s conduct at the time he 
or she performs the act, but they also pertain to the impact exerted on 
that individual as part of exercising the protective function.
The above statement has significant consequences. To satisfy the 
nullum crimen standard, it ought to be proven that, in the reality of a giv-
en case, the perpetrator’s act was punishable under binding provisions. 
The specific source of this prohibition subject to penalty is irrelevant as 
long as it remains in line with norms of international law. The matter 
of ignorance of the law should be referred to the content of a norm and 
not its origin177. The nullum crimen principle refers to the content of 
a prohibition/order subject to penalty and not to its source. The above 
statement is supported by the case law of international courts of jus-
tice178. Therefore, according to the nullum crimen principle, the state may 
introduce a norm that imposes a penalty for any behaviour performed 
abroad provided that it constitutes a crime also under international law 
or national law that the perpetrator was bound to at the moment of 
175 Kreß, supra note 164; Shahabuddeen, supra note 80, at 1008.
176 Piotr Hofmański, Komentarz do Art. 7 [Commentary on Article 7.], in 1 Konwencja 
o  Ochronie Praw Człowieka i  Podstawowych Wolności. Komentarz do artykułów 
1–18 [1 Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Comment on Articles 1–18] 462 (Lech Garlicki ed. 2010).
177 Studnicki, supra note 145, at 580.
178 Schaack, supra note 162, at 158–172.
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performing the act. In many cases, the perpetrator’s act is considered 
punishable by representatives of all cultural backgrounds, while the 
need to specify the basis for the validity of a given norm comes down to 
a formal requirement that ensures the consistency of dogmatic concepts. 
The more significant the cultural differences, the more important it is to 
communicate the norm effectively179.
Thus, to define the limits of ius puniendi, it is vital to specify in 
which cases a given behaviour may be considered a punishable criminal 
act under international law or foreign law. If one succeeds in proving 
that such penalisation takes place using commonly accepted criteria, 
the nullum  crimen principle will not be infringed by the forum state. 
The nature of these criteria cannot be subject here to a detailed analysis 
due to a  limited volume of this paper – in this respect, one ought to 
refer to subject literature and the case law of international courts of jus-
tice180. Considerations pertaining to this issue should be limited solely to 
a statement that a behaviour over which a criminal court has jurisdiction 
under the law of the eligible state (the “domestic law”) constitutes an 
indictable offence. It appears though that, taking into account the objec-
tive of the nullum crimen principle related to the guarantee function of 
criminal law, the context of legal proceedings181 indicated by the ECHR 
may serve as a criterion. Wherever a given behaviour is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts responsible for deciding on criminal liability 
and making decisions aimed at executing the criminal law function, the 
perpetrator’s conduct may be deemed a punishable act.
As for the sources of international law that may potentially intro-
duce conduct penalisation, one ought to indicate Article 38 of the stat-
ute of the ICJ, which provides for a list of sources of international law 
in general. These include international agreements, customs and general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations182. Without subjecting 
179 Kratochwil, supra note 3, at 78.
180 Judgement of the ECHR, Achour v. France, no. 67335/01; Judgement of the ECHR 
Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03; Judgement of the ECHR, Del Río Prada 
v. Spain [GC], no. 42750/09; Judgement of the European Court of Justice, Degussa 
AG v Commission of the European Communities, case T-279/02.
181 Scoppola v. Italy, supra note 180; Kociubiński, supra note 173, at 278.
182 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, the Art. 38: 
“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general 
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them here to an in-depth analysis, it should be noted that, in line with 
the nullum crimen principle, considering a given act a crime under an 
international custom constitutes a condition that allows the national ius 
puniendi to be extended onto all behaviours of this type, regardless of 
the place of the perpetrator’s act, the perpetrator’s nationality, cultural 
context, etc. Usually, a custom should then be considered the strongest 
basis of penalisation, whereas national penal norms, which are a reflec-
tion of a custom, make use of the common nature of its validity. The 
matter of the law provided for in conventions is very much different183, 
as international agreements are binding only to the extent permitted 
by the powers of the individual states parties. This results from the fact 
that no one is competent to transfer to another one more rights than 
the former possesses, which pertains to both legislative jurisdiction 
and powers that comprise ius puniendi. Moreover, when treaties specify 
obligations for penalising certain behaviours, they refer directly to ju-
risdictional rights of the individual signatories184. The general principles 
of international law185 provide for a possibility to penalize behaviours 
that are not criminalised in domestic law or in custom law or treaty 
law186. Considering that at present a new jurisdictional nexus is being 
formed, allowing one to refer to the need to protect human rights, 
the exemption analysed here loses its significance. To justify using ius 
puniendi by referring to Nuremberg clauses, one ought to prove that 
or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b.  in-
ternational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 
59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This pro-
vision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if 
the parties agree thereto.”
183 Meron, supra note 83, at 90–92.
184 As an example, UN General Assembly, Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic 
in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 2 December 1949, A/
RES/317, the Art. 11: “Nothing in the present Convention shall be interpreted as de-
termining the attitude of a Party towards the general question of the limits of criminal 
jurisdiction under international law.”
185 Hofmański, supra note 176, at 462; Piotr Hofmański, Konwencja europejska a prawo 
karne [European Convention and Criminal Law] 305–306 (1995).
186 Kociubiński, supra note 173, at 281. In this context, however, it is advisable to quote 
M.  Shahabuddeen: “it is not enough that the alleged act is merely immoral, it is 
enough that it is regarded by the community of nations as fundamentally criminal” – 
Shahabuddeen, supra note 80, at 1011.
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there is no other basis for penalisation that would have a higher degree 
of definitiveness.
3.3. “Fluid” borderlines of an extraterritorial ius puniendi
In conclusion, it can be noted that the limits of ius puniendi are excep-
tionally fluid. They reflect a certain compromise between the power to 
exercise the criminal law function and the sovereignty of other states 
and human rights. This compromise is not as much developed, as de-
veloping in the course of historical progress and is subject to ongoing, 
yet slow transformations187. The states that take part in internation-
al transactions shape principles of their own criminal jurisdiction using 
numerous means and – in the light of the indefiniteness of rules – in 
a way that tests the scope of their powers both regarding legislation and 
the application of the law. Each state that sees its sovereignty infringed 
by another state’s excessively extended right to punish may bring pro-
ceedings in this regard before the International Court of Justice and thus 
verify the limits of ius puniendi, contributing to further specification of 
the “fluid” standard188. On the other hand – which is a significant new 
approach – in the case of states that recognise the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights, such a complaint can be filed also 
by an individual who could prove that the respondent state’s excessively 
extended scope of ius puniendi has infringed his or her rights provided 
for in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights189. 
Simultaneously, all decisions of the state related to establishing criminal 
law norms in the broad sense must fall within thus determined limits – 
observing the directions comprising legislative jurisdiction on the one 
hand and the scope of the right to punish on the other.
187 Donnelly, supra note 83, at 57.
188 Also important is the case law of the national courts – in this respect: Meron, supra 
note 83, at 114–135.
189 According to the Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and  14, 
4 November 1950, ETS 5, the Art 34: “The Court may receive applications from any 
person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the vic-
tim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to 
hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”
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4. Criminal law norms in the broad sense in the international context
The scope of the above-described competencies of the state that com-
prise legislative jurisdiction and the right to punish have a fundamental 
impact on the shaping of the limits of the validity of criminal law norms 
in space. Below is a  method of interpreting a  sanctioning norm and 
a sanctioned norm, which accounts for the limited nature of state au-
thority. According to the assumption, it is to ensure the broadest possible 
execution of state powers comprising ius puniendi while taking account 
of the requirements of international law.
4.1. Sanctioned norm in an international context
Deriving a sanctioned norm from two different categories of normative 
expressions (1. prohibition/order, 2. directives) will impinge on the way 
of settling the matter of criminal liability in the case of crimes commit-
ted abroad. It seems significant to have two matters settled. Firstly, one 
should determine the normative sources from which to decode indi-
vidual constituent categories of a norm, and secondly, the scope of their 
competence to set standards.
As proven above, the source of a prohibition lies in criminal legis-
lation, whereas directives come from non-penal normative expressions. 
Further considerations pertain to arguments supportive of a thesis that 
the said prohibition/order ought always to be derived from the law of 
the forum state, while the adequacy of directives might be derived from 
provisions of the forum state or foreign provisions depending on the 
reality of a given case.
Such a solution helps to achieve two very important goals within the 
scope of the criminal policy. On the one hand, it helps to take into ac-
count the need to ensure normative grounds for courts to deliver judge-
ments that would be concurrent with the value system of the society on 
whose behalf it administers justice190. On the other hand, it supports 
the creation of a space for cooperation in terms of penalisation where 
ius puniendi is exercised with regard to other states’ sovereignty and 
human rights.
190 Hallevy, supra note 18, at 83.
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The key argument supportive of deriving the prohibition from the 
legislation of a state on behalf of which the right to punish is exercised 
is the need to ensure control over conditions of criminal illegality191 for 
the forum state. This term should be understood as a characteristic of 
conduct that justifies the use of means of necessary self-defence in line 
with the Penal Code on the one hand (and thus indicates what is licit in 
the light of the legislation) and conditions the possibility to determine 
the punishability of conduct on the other. For if one was to assume that 
there is a general principle that justifies the use of foreign law only in 
reconstructing a sanctioned norm, he or she would have to accept an 
indefinite number of foreign norms of unspecified content being intro-
duced into the legislation system of the forum state and taking them 
under the protection of national and sanctioning norms, as this is the 
essence of the mechanism of concurrent norms. Consequently, it would 
be inevitable to declare that the criminal law of the forum state sanctions 
the prohibitions/orders binding in other legal systems provided that their 
content can be related to the content of the sanctioning norm. This, in 
turn, could lead to axiologically unacceptable consequences, particularly 
regarding the recognition of specific behaviours as unlawful. In the view 
of international law, the forum state would thus waive the wide scope of 
rights derived from sovereignty (the right to establish prohibitive norms 
binding abroad) and transfer them onto all the existing foreign states. 
Moreover, interpreting a prohibition/order based on national law allows 
one to introduce relevant corrections in the content of a sanctioned norm. 
This takes place in the case of an introduction of a standard of protection 
into foreign law that is excessively low or high. This issue is examined 
further in the paper.
As far as a prohibition/order regarding a specific conduct is derived 
from the law of the forum state, the source of directives of conduct may 
lie in foreign legislation. This results from their character since they reg-
ulate individual aspects of life in a precise way and are seldom established 
as part of the area of a foreign state’s exclusive power. For instance, in 
191 The essence of criminal wrongdoing was echoed by E. Bulygin, writing: “‘All that is not 
penally prohibited is penally permitted’. The fact that an action is penally permitted 
means that it does not incur penal sanctions, but it does not exclude the possibility that 
it may be prohibited by some other norm (e.g., a police edict, norm of civil law, etc.).” – 
Alchourrón & Bulygin, supra note 96, at 143; Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, supra 
note 4, at 166.
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a situation where a Polish citizen hits a pedestrian on a crosswalk in 
Great Britain, the actualisation of the sanctioning norms takes place as 
a result of an infringement of the sanctioned norm interpreted under 
Article 177 of the Penal Code, further specified by the relevant traffic 
regulations binding in the place of the act.
Therefore, the suggested interpretive method assumes forming of 
a mixed sanctioned norm consisting of standard-setting expressions de-
rived from various legal orders (the formerly defined model takes on the 
following formula in this approach: NY = Zy – (PX1 + PY2 + PY3)192. This 
requires defining the limits of the competence to set standards of the two 
categories of expression, both a prohibition and individual directives 
that make its content adequate. To this end, one should refer to criteria 
that define the limits of legislative jurisdiction and the right to punish 
and apply them to both categories of standard-setting expressions. This 
constitutes the second of the issues distinguished above.
The prohibition/order is the central element of a sanctioned norm, 
without which a norm of conduct addressed to an individual cannot be 
considered a sanctioned norm, functionally conjugated with a sanction-
ing norm. Thus, the matter of determining the scope of its “competence 
to set standards”, also in the spatial context, is of key importance. Here, 
two possibilities can be indicated.
On the one hand, it might be said that the competence to set stand-
ards of a prohibition is determined in the very same way as in the case of 
the validity of sanctioning norms – with the use of criminal jurisdiction 
principles (territoriality principle, protective principle, universal princi-
ple, etc.193). In the case of the Polish Penal Code, these are provided for 
in Article 5 and in Chapter 13 of the Penal Code194. Nevertheless, this 
192 This approach seems to diverge from the widely accepted model assuming the inter-
pretation of penal norms solely on the basis of national law – see: Hallevy, supra note 
18, at 86.
193 The principles of criminal jurisdiction have been described, among others, in the doc-
ument Extraterritorial, supra note 147, see also: Doyle, supra note 2, at 13–15.
194 Criminal codes of other countries: Strafgesetzbuch in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung 
vom 13. November 1998 (BGBl. I S. 3322), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes 
vom 30. Oktober 2017 (BGBl. I S. 3618) geändert worden ist [German Criminal 
Code], articles: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; Code pénal, version consolidée au 16 décembre 
2017 [French Criminal Code], articles from 113–2 to 113–13; Уголовный кодекс 
Российской Федерации от 13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред. от 19.02.2018) [Russian 
Criminal Code], articles 11, 12.
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solution does not seem acceptable. The prohibition/order has a regula-
tory nature and its content must be recognisable at the time of the act. 
However, principles of criminal jurisdiction are based to some extent on 
uncertain future conditions (here one ought to indicate, for instance, the 
condition of gaining profit within the territory of a given state – a strin-
gent protective principle, or staying in the territory of the state having 
committed the act – the principle of substitutive criminalisation). Here, 
it would be vital to interpret jurisdictional principles to allow one to 
explicitly determine if a given prohibition/order could be an element of 
a norm as early as at the time of the perpetrator’s act or omission, which 
in turn would result in the state’s competence being substantially limited.
The above problems do not occur if one assumes that a prohibition/
order is subject to the very same rules as all other regulatory stand-
ard-setting expressions. In this approach, the limits of the “competence 
to set standards” of a prohibition/order would be defined by the state’s 
competence to set standards’ of specific social situations. However, this 
solution would lead to unacceptable consequences as well since, if the 
scope of the competence to set standards of a prohibition/order was dic-
tated by the national legislative jurisdiction in the classic sense, in all cas-
es where the presence of a jurisdictional nexus cannot be demonstrated, 
it would be impossible to consider a given conduct as illegal – therefore, it 
would be impossible to hold the perpetrator criminally liable. The reason 
is that in practice there are cases where the right to punish is executed 
with regard to the perpetrator who performed a conduct abroad in a sit-
uation where at the time of the act no legally relevant nexuses that would 
define the scope of legislative jurisdiction were determined (state X can 
punish a perpetrator of a car accident that occurred in the territory of the 
state Y, yet it cannot define road traffic regulations within that territory).
Given the above, neither examining the limits of validity of a prohi-
bition from the perspective of legislative jurisdiction nor relating them 
solely to jurisdictional solutions provided for in the Penal Code gives 
satisfying results. The reason is that the analysed prohibition/order, 
which constitutes an element of a sanctioned norm, lies in-between the 
standard-setting power and the right to punish. In this regard, it seems 
that it should be subject to rules specific for both of these competencies 
to a relevant extent. Given the objective for which the prohibition/order 
is distinguished, the scope of the competence to set standards ought to 
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coincide with the scope of the power to execute criminal law objectives 
provided under ius puniendi. The very fact that such power exists results 
in a limited scope of competence to impact individuals’ conduct by im-
posing penal norms. As long as such a prohibition operates within the 
limits of criminal law defined above, it ought to be considered binding – 
there are no factors that would prevent it from being introduced.
The limits of the “competence to set standards” of a prohibition/order 
are thus determined in an exceptionally broad manner, being in fact a re-
flection of the limits of competency to exercise the criminal law function 
in a regulatory manner (general prevention). The principles of criminal 
jurisdiction present in national law have no direct effect on their scope. 
The above solution also eliminates issues related to the limits of classic 
legislative jurisdiction. Simultaneously, considering that the content of 
a prohibition/order is made adequate by means of directives of conduct, 
which are also derived from foreign law, the threat of an infringement of 
the foreign state’s sovereignty or human rights becomes virtually non-ex-
istent. In this case, the broad scope of the “competence to set standards” 
is neutralised by means of the content of a prohibition being relevantly 
narrowed by directives of conduct.
Moving onto the analysis of the scope of the “competence to set 
standards” of directives of conduct, one ought to note that it is defined 
using criteria that determine the limits of legislative jurisdiction. This 
problem was discussed above but now it is necessary to analyse it in the 
context of the prohibition/order. It is possible that because of application 
of the rule of reason, the directives binding in a particular case will be 
contradictory with the analogical directives derived from the legal sys-
tem of the forum state. The question is whether the court of the forum 
state is obliged to derive the sanctioned norm from such a “contradictory 
directive”.
However, in the context of criminal liability one ought to note that 
particular directives of conduct serve various functions, whereas dif-
ferences that occur in this regard should be considered when resolving 
the above problem. Basically, one can distinguish here two categories of 
situations.
It is possible that the discrepancy in terms of the content translates 
into a change in the right protection standard – let us take for example 
left- and right-hand traffic. Here, the dominant role should be given to 
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those directives of conduct whose competence to set standards is based 
on a territorial nexus. In essence, the thing is here only to choose a tech-
nical method for ensuring a proper standard of legal rights protection, 
whose effectiveness depends on respecting the very same rules by all 
participants of a given legal transaction.
In practice, a number of situations occur, though, where differences 
between the content of directives stem from discrepancies existing even 
at the level of the value system195. This is reflected in various scopes of 
protection granted to individual legal rights, where the situation can take 
two forms. Firstly, the standard of protection provided for in directives 
of conduct derived from the law of the forum state might be lower than 
the standard provided for in the law of the place of the act. Secondly, it 
might be the case that the law of the forum state has a higher standard of 
protection. In both cases, basing the scope of competence to set stand-
ards solely on directions specified in the rule of reason could lead to 
unacceptable consequences. The content of a prohibition/order would 
become adequate in a way that is contrary to the will of the society of the 
forum state. Therefore, it seems necessary to introduce proper correc-
tions at the level of ensuring adequacy of the prohibition/order. The said 
corrections are void in international law, whereas introduction of such 
correction into the legal system ought to be an expression of a state’s will 
as a sovereign entity.
In cases where the law of the place of the act provides for a higher 
standard of legal right protection (directives of conduct are more restric-
tive in this regard), the content of a prohibition/order is unduly narrow. 
For instance, when ordering the use of specialist security systems in cars 
195 It is worth repeating in this place the statement of W. Wróbel [translation – DZ]: “It is 
the opinion of a certain subject that something is useful and something is not, some-
thing worthy of praise and something is reprehensible. Of course, the ethical system 
will try to absolutise its evaluation, trying defining some behaviour as reprehensible 
behaviour, independently from the social context. It is true that every legal system is 
based on a certain hierarchy of values. It is also true that it is a hierarchy of values of 
the legislator.” – Włodzimierz Wróbel, Pojęcie “dobra prawnego” w wykładni przepisów 
prawa karnego [The Concept of “Legal Good” In the Interpretation of Criminal Law], in 
Aktualne problemy prawa karnego. Księga pamiątkowa z okazji Jubileuszu 70. urodzin 
Profesora Andrzeja J. Szwarca [Current Problems of Criminal Law. Memorial Book on 
the Occasion of the 70th Birthday of Professor Andrzej J. Szwarc] 621 (Łukasz Pohl 
ed. 2009). In the case described above, there is a collision between these hierarchies 
of legislators.
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or particularly durable construction materials, a foreign state limits the 
content of a prohibition/order to a much lesser extent than in the case of 
using directives of conduct that do not provide for this sort of require-
ments. If a conduct that does not correspond to a directive results in, e.g., 
a person’s death, it should be assumed that conditions for illegality are 
fulfilled, resulting in the imposition of a penalty. This may lead to the con-
ditions for criminal liability becoming separate from the value system of 
society in the name of which ius puniendi is exercised. Directives of con-
duct are examined in the context of their impact on a sanctioned norm 
of the forum state. The said norm affects judgements provided by a court 
of the forum state and not the state of the place of the act’s execution. 
There are no conditions whatsoever that order the forum state to respect 
foreign norms to an extent that could lead to an unacceptable extension 
of a category of behaviour that is illicit under the national criminal law. 
Though a standard-setting expression derived from a foreign legal order 
may block execution of the right to punish, it cannot make a court of the 
forum state impose a penalty. In the examined situation, the contents of 
a prohibition/order ought to be narrowed in line with the standard of 
protection relevant to the forum state. Consequently, neither the perpe-
trator’s powers (his or her freedom is thus expanded) nor powers of third 
states (their competencies to set standards or to punish are not excluded) 
become limited. Considering the above, one should advocate the possi-
bility of disregarding excessively restrictive foreign directives of conduct 
in the process of ensuring the adequacy of a prohibition. Such a treatment 
is not considered an infringement of international law or the sovereignty 
of third states. The absence of classic jurisdictional nexuses also does not 
constitute any obstacle since it is proven in the paper that the binding 
effect of a prohibition against/order to undertake a given conduct is de-
rived from the power to exercise the law to punish, which to a certain 
extent is also regulatory. In this case, the result is only a limitation of the 
prohibition whose binding effect is already determined. Consequently, 
it ought to be assumed that, in a situation where a directive of conduct 
that was interpreted based on foreign law introduces an excessively high 
(in the view of the forum state) standard of conduct in regard to a legal 
right, the prohibition should be made adequate by including relevant 
directives derived from the law of the forum state. Though they cannot 
regulate the very conduct of the perpetrator, they have the capacity to 
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shape conditions for criminal liability to some extent under the law of 
the forum state. Thus, the forum state would only limit itself in exercising 
the right to punish.
The other of the distinguished categories pertains to cases where 
the law that the perpetrator is bound to provides for a lower standard of 
legal rights protection, e.g., by permitting driving a car over 50 miles per 
hour or 90 km/h in a built-up area. Obviously, individual states attempt 
to ensure protection primarily over those legal rights that they consider 
most important, limiting the possibility of other rights as a result. The 
situation becomes complicated when an eligible state competent to set 
up directives of conduct introduces provisions that limit the scope of 
a prohibition/order in an excessive manner, e.g., by permitting rape in 
certain circumstances. A question arises as to the extent to which the 
forum state may disregard directives of conduct in the process of de-
coding a sanctioned norm, given that the said directives are provided for 
in foreign law, with the sole reason being that they lead to an excessive 
limitation of a prohibition/order. In this regard, the common denomina-
tor allowing for a decision to be made is human rights. Nevertheless, it 
should be assumed that, if a standard pertaining to legal rights protection 
established based on foreign directives remains in line with the mini-
mum standard set up by human rights, the forum state cannot disregard 
these directives in the process of decoding a given sanctioned norm, as 
this would constitute a violation of the sovereignty of the eligible state 
competent to lay down norms. The power to disregard a directive and, 
hence, to extend a prohibition/order is formed only if it is found to be in 
conflict with human rights.
The matter of the contents of the human rights protection standard 
is naturally questionable since as of now it remains ill-defined and is 
characterised by culturally determined discrepancies196. It seems, though, 
that for that very reason states must make decisions regarding penalisa-
tion – it is the only way to provoke conflicts of jurisdiction that can be 
resolved on an international level, which in turn will allow clear rules to 
emerge in this regard.
A situation where the above-described solution ought to be ap-
plied without doubts in terms of being in conflict with human rights, 
196 Meron, supra note 83, at 79–81; Donnelly, supra note 83, at 89–106.
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though with tremendous practical meaning, can be exemplified by an 
attacker who gets killed when acting under conditions of an honour 
killing197, which is still practised in certain locations worldwide. When 
assessing the conduct solely from the view of norms binding for the 
place of the act, the behaviour of the person attempting homicide must 
be considered legal, whereas the behaviour of the person who protected 
herself constitutes an illegal act. An assessment made in line with the 
norms of Western culture gives a totally different result. However, if one 
was to transfer these considerations onto the level of rules comprising 
the common human rights protection system, one ought to stress that 
the rule of conduct that permits the killing of a victim who dishonoured 
her family may be disregarded as not binding. The freedom of setting is 
limited not only by the sovereignty of other entities but also by commonly 
binding norms of international law (erga omnes198). Consequently, one 
197 See: Amin A. Muhammad, Preliminary Examination of so-called “Honour Killings” in 
Canada, Cat. No. J4-23/2013E-PDF, http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/hk-
ch/hk_eng.pdf; Jane Hailé, Honour Killing, its Causes & Consequences: Suggested 
Strategies for the European Parliament, Policy Department External Policies, December 
(2007), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/385527/
EXPO-JOIN_ET(2007)385527_EN.pdf. Particular attention should be paid to Art. 340 
of the Jordanian Penal Code, in the version pre-2001: “He who surprises his wife, or 
one of his [female] mahrams committing adultery with somebody [in flagrante delicto], 
and kills, wounds, or injures one or both of them, shall be exempt from liability. ii). He 
who surprises his wife, or one of his female ascendants or descendants or sisters with 
another in an unlawful bed, and he kills or wounds or injures one or both of them, shall 
be liable to a lesser penalty [in view of extenuating circumstances].” – quote for: Suheir 
Azzouni, Palestine Palestinian Authority and Israeli-Occupied Territories, in: Women’s 
rights in the Middle East and North Africa progress amid resistance 389 (Sanja Kelly & 
Julia Breslin eds. – 2010). See also: Honoring the Killers: Justice Denied For “Honor” 
Crimes In Jordan, 16 Human Rights Watch (April 2004). In the process of evaluating 
the validity of the norms, it seems necessary to define the nature of the exclusion of 
criminal liability itself, in particular to demonstrate that the legal system is exempted 
from the illegality of behaviour and not its punishment. In the latter case, behaviour can 
also be considered illegal under foreign law. The question is how to verify the nature of 
the exclusion. It may be useful to compare statutory provisions concerning the issue of 
self-defence and the tested exclusion of criminal responsibility. If their structure is similar, 
then they can be considered to have a similar character. See: Agnieszka Gutkowska, 
Prawo karne wobec wyzwań wielokulturowości. Przestępstwa kulturowe na przykładzie 
wymuszonego małżeństwa [Criminal Law and the Challenges of Multiculturalism. 
Cultural Crimes on the Example of Forced Marriage], in Idee Nowelizacji Kodeksu 
Karnego [Ideas of the Revision of Criminal Code] 243–248 (Marek Lubelski, Renata 
Pawlik & Adam Strzelec ed., 2014).
198 T. Meron, supra note 83, at 188–201; Katariina Simonen, State versus the Individual. 
The Unresolved Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention 56–57 (Nijhoff 2011). The ef-
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ought to conclude that the wording of the prohibition to kill has not been 
made adequate by involving the consent to commit an honour killing. 
The perpetrator’s attack thus violates a sanctioned norm (being illegal), 
whereas the behaviour of the would-be victim is considered a necessary 
self-defence. In this perspective, considerations regarding the illegal na-
ture of the woman’s behaviour prove groundless by necessity.
A thus decoded sanctioned norm constitutes not only a directive of 
conduct but also a pattern of assessment of the perpetrator’s conduct in 
terms of its illegal nature. In a situation where a given conduct proves 
contradictory to the disposition of the sanctioned norm, it is vital that the 
conduct is further verified in terms of other conditions for punishability 
specified by the sanctioning norm.
4.2. Sanctioning norm in the international context
As it was said above, the sanctioning norm is the direct normative ba-
sis of imposing punishment. Its sole addressee is the court as an entity 
that decides on holding an individual who infringed a sanctioned norm 
criminally liable199.
This is crucial for determining the validity of the sanctioning norm as 
a norm that indicates conduct, as this does not pertain to an individual 
but to a legislative body that operates in a normative space exclusively. 
Thus, the judge, Mr X, is not bound to a disposition of a sanctioning 
norm, but the court that delivers the judgement on behalf of the forum 
state is. It is possible to precisely determine under procedural provisions 
in what circumstances the behaviour shall be treated as an act of a body 
or as the conduct of an individual. This will allow us to determine the 
category of conduct with the binding disposition of a sanctioning norm. 
fectiveness of the erga omnes standards had been confirmed by the rulings of the 
international tribunals: Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971; Nuclear Tests (Australia 
v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 1995; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 200.
199 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 275; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 178; Pohl, 
supra note 92, at 28.
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Moreover, considering that fulfilment of the order to impose a penalty 
requires taking conventional actions, whose validity is conditioned by 
a proper procedure and a relevant authorisation of the court to enforce 
the ordered activities200 being maintained, it should be assumed that the 
limits of validity of a sanctioned norm in space cannot be broader than 
those of the court’s authorisation to perform major conventional actions. 
In this regard, an exceptionally strong relationship between a sanctioning 
norm and procedural standards can be seen. Hence, sanctioning norms 
viewed as norms that order the imposition of a punishment for an aggra-
vated infringement of a sanctioned norm should be considered to apply 
in a geographic space where national courts can operate. The scope of 
validity of that norm cannot be larger than the scope of powers of the 
national administration of justice.
In the light of the subject of this paper, determining the elements that 
comprise the sanctioning norm hypothesis seems most important, since 
exercising the said norm serves as a condition for the actualisation of an 
order to impose a penalty. This is because infringement of a sanctioned 
norm is merely one of these elements and not all cases where a prohi-
bition or an order derived from the said norm is a violated result in the 
actualisation of a sanctioning norm. Here, other elements not provided 
for in the content of the sanctioned norm are required to occur. Given the 
considerations made in this paper, those specified as principles of crimi-
nal jurisdiction seem particularly significant: the territoriality principle, 
active and passive personality principles, protective principle, the prin-
ciple of universal jurisdiction, and the principle of vicarious jurisdiction. 
To some extent, these may be complemented with the above-mentioned 
dual criminality requirement.
One should note their dual normative character. On the one hand, 
they specify the content of a sanctioning norm, thus serving as the legal 
criteria of an indictable offence201. Here, the full role described by the 
symbol Psn in the formula is specified by conditions of criminality, whose 
presence is vital for holding the perpetrator criminally liable202 (the per-
petrator’s citizenship, recognition of the conduct as a crime under foreign 
200 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 275; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 178–179.
201 Kardas, O relacjach, supra note 92, at 45; Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 275.
202 See: Włodzimierz Wróbel, Andrzej Zoll, Polskie prawo karne. Część ogólna [Polish 
Criminal Law. The General Part] 139 (2010).
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legislation, etc.). On the other hand, they constitute distinct metanorms 
(Nm) that affect the interpretation of all elements of a sanctioned norm203, 
thus serving as framework provisions204; in this regard, they determine, 
among others, the application area of the criminal law, etc.
It should be noted that the principles of criminal jurisdiction do not 
limit the validity of a norm in space in so far as regarding limits set by 
legally relevant nexuses. They do not determine in any way the applica-
bility of the norm in space, but contribute to the hypothesis of a sanc-
tioning norm. The limits of the validity of sanctioning norms viewed as 
norms that impose certain actions to be executed by the court must be 
determined in isolation from criteria provided for in the principles of 
criminal jurisdiction. A court of state X cannot be said to be bound to 
a sanctioning norm in situations where the judgement is delivered within 
the territory of the said country, in respect of the citizen, etc. Authorities 
of a given state may have its bodies bound to the norms of any content 
in so far as they remain within the limits set by international law. In this 
view, the principles of criminal jurisdiction affect only the content of 
a sanctioning norm and not its spatial validity. At the same time, juris-
dictional principles themselves constitute solely a certain proposition 
of how such conditions could be described. The state can form them 
as it wishes as far as it remains within the limits of its ius puniendi, as 
sanctioning norms constitute a result of exercising the law and have no 
regulatory nature from an individual’s perspective. The competencies to 
set such standards ought to be considered part of the exclusive powers.
5. How it works in practice
To examine the above method of interpretation of penal norms, it will 
be useful to discuss the case of Mr John Doe, briefly presented in the 
introductory part. To make things clearer, let us assume that under the 
“pure” X law (without international context) he committed the crime of 
incitement to murder. Under the “pure” Y law, his act was legal because 
of the above-mentioned “transplantation provisions”. None of these states 
203 Kardas, Zbieg, supra note 92, at 275; Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 222.
204 Dąbrowska-Kardas, supra note 92, at 78–87. The resemblance between the principles 
of criminal jurisdiction and the rules of intertemporal law can be seen on this back-
ground – see: Wróbel, supra note 92, at 489–490.
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provides any special regulation of the spatial extent of the validity of 
domestic norms.
The question is: is it possible to impose the punishment on Mr Doe 
for his act committed in Y state?
As a first step, the content of the sanctioned norm that was binding 
Mr Doe during his behaviour has to be established. As previously ex-
plained, the prohibition/order must be interpreted by the legal system of 
the forum state – on the basis of the analysed case, under the law of X. It 
is beyond any doubt (under argumentation presented above) that state X 
has the power to execute the ius puniendi against Mr Doe. Thus, in this 
scope the sanctioned norm gets the foregoing form: “No one is allowed 
to incite anyone to cause the death of a human…”
The second element of the sanctioned norm is the directives of be-
haviour. In the subject case many such directives are in force. From the 
perspective of the topic of this work, the most important is this one that 
contains the permission for causing death because of organ donation 
(under Y law), in the foregoing form: “…, unless such act is undertaken 
for the purpose of commercial transplantation of organs, etc.” It is neces-
sary to establish whether the above directive has to be taken into account 
in the process of an interpretation-sanctioned norm.
To achieve this goal, in the beginning, it is necessary to analyse all of 
the jurisdictional links existing in the above case. The nexuses of territo-
ry and citizenship of the victim are arguments for the strong legislative 
jurisdiction of Y state. On the contrary, the competency of state X is 
based only on the formal bonds with the perpetrator. But the assessment 
of the weightiness of jurisdictional links has to be done in concreto. In 
this way, the territorial nexus is used by Mr Doe instrumentally – not to 
protect the cultural standard of the region but for formal justification of 
unjust behaviour. What is more, even such standard does not deserve 
protection – it is contrary to human rights, especially human dignity and 
the right to live. Because of that fact, from the perspective of international 
standards, it is possible to reject the usage of the analysed directive in the 
process of interpretation of the sanctioned norm.
Analysing this issue from the perspective of internationally protected 
values, it has to be noted that neither sovereignty of state Y nor human 
rights will be breached by the proposed solution. Mr Doe is aware of the 
illegality of his act – it is a reason for his travel to state Y. He is not protect-
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ed by the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. On the other hand, state Y 
has no right to enforce the law, which allows homicide for the purpose 
of transplanting organs. It is contrary to commonly accepted human 
rights principles. In consequence, enforcing the law of state X, which is 
contrary to the above directive, cannot be treated as an infringement of 
the sovereignty of state Y.
In consequence, the prohibition, “No one is allowed to incite anyone 
to cause the death of a human…”, shall be treated as binding and Mr Doe 
has to obey the sanctioned norm, based on the above prohibition.
Of course, as previously stated, both the scope of sovereignty and 
the standard of human rights protection are not precisely defined. But 
they can be established only in the course of enforcement of the law. It 
is true that such an approach can lead the state before the international 
courts, but only in this way is it possible to develop universally acceptable 
grounds of criminal responsibility for crimes committed abroad.
From the perspective of the sanctioning norm, it has to be noticed 
that Mr Doe is a citizen of state X. In this case the principle of nationality 
is binding. Assuming that the above principle is included in the criminal 
code of state X, the domestic court is obliged to impose the punish-
ment on Mr Doe. Of course, state X can introduce a modification of the 
principle, for example, by connecting it with the requirement of double 
punishability. A concrete shape of extraterritorial jurisdiction depends 
on the political vision of a state.

85
Conclusion
Owing to the analysis of the conditions of establishing criminal liability 
for indictable offences perpetrated abroad from the perspective of the 
theory of conjugated norms, it is possible to put individual elements that 
limit the scope of validity of individual standards of conduct into a sin-
gle framework of a broader construct that basically covers all aspects of 
criminal liability. As a result of the adoption of the above solution, the 
content of a sanctioned norm becomes disconnected from the rules of 
criminal jurisdiction in the classic sense. This, in turn, implies the ne-
cessity to carry out a dual assessment of the perpetrator’s conduct. The 
content of the sanctioned norm to which the perpetrator was bound at 
the time of the act should be determined in the first place. Only then is 
it acceptable to state that the analysed behaviour was an illegal act. The 
next step is to verify the punishability of the behaviour, provided that the 
only condition that limits the application of national assessment criteria 
is the sovereignty of foreign states and human rights. In this regard, one 
may distinguish three stages of the reasoning that ought to be delivered 
by the court in order to determine whether the perpetrator can be held 
criminally liable in a given case. These can be described as follows.
1. Determining the scope of the “competence to set directives” of an 
order/prohibition, one ought to examine whether a given prohibi-
tion is valid as a binding directive of conduct in any scope what-
soever without infringing the sovereignty of a third state, with the 
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need to respect the sovereignty of third entities and human rights 
as a criterion;
2. Ensuring the adequacy of the content of a  prohibition/order by 
means of determining directives of conduct to which the perpetra-
tor is bound to in so far, since the content of the prohibition can be 
subjected to adjustments due to excessively restrictive foreign norms 
or due to the need to protect values protected by human rights;
3. In the event that the thus reconstructed standard of conduct is in-
fringed by the perpetrator’s behaviour, verifying other conditions for 
establishing criminal liability provided for in the national criminal 
legislation, which comprise the sanctioning norm.
The above-presented model of decoding penal norms in the broad sense 
allows the right to punish to be executed on a broad basis within limits 
set out by international law for legislative jurisdiction and with ius pu-
niendi taken into account. The practical use of the thus decoded norms 
will obviously depend on the specific procedural conditions being met. 
Still, this matter is beyond the scope of these considerations.
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